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RETIREMENT SECURITY AND TAX EQUITY:
AN EVALUATION OF
ERISA
DANIEL I. HALPERIN*
No one can be certain how long he can work, how long he will
live after stopping work or about the cost of living at that time.
Moreover, retirement seems so remote when one is young. For these
and other reasons, it is unlikely that most individuals, left to their own
devices, would provide for an adequate retirement income.'
At least a subsistence level of living for the working population is
provided through Social Security. 2 While public policy appears to de-
mand assurance of continuity in the worker's standard of living, Con-
gress has not yet raised Social Security benefits to that level. 3 Rather,
it has tried, through special tax benefits, to encourage the establish-
ment of private pension plans to fill the gap. 4 The enactment of
ERISA—the Employees Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 5 —reflects increased Congressional concern with the inadequacy
of retirement income. This article explores the problems which led to
ERISA and attempts to grade Congress on its achievement. Specific
provisions of the Act will be discussed in detail only to the extent
necessary to make the policy discussion intelligible.°
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Tax Incentives–The Catalyst
There is a dilemma in relying on purely voluntary, employer es-
*Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. The research assistance of
Thomas L. Holzman of the University of Pennsylvania Law School Class of 1977 is
gratefully acknowledged.
' See J. PECIIMAN, H. AARON, M. TAUSSIG, SOCIAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVES FOR
REFORM 61.
2 42 U.S.C. § 402 (1970), as amended, (Stapp. IV, 1974),
3 See Ball, Social Security & Private Pension Plans, 27 NAT'L TAX J. 467, 469 (1974).
For a more complete discussion of the adequacy of Social Security to meet retirement
needs, see Section VII of this Article.
° SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE. PRIVATE PENSION PLAN REFORM S. REP. No. 383, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REP.].
5 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (Supp. IV, 1975) [hereinafter cited as ERISA].
6 For details as to the operation and histdry of ERISA, see, e.g., Chadwick & Fos-
ter, Federal Regulation of Retirement Plans: The Quest for Parity, 28 VAND L. REV. 641
(1975); Goetz, Income Tax Aspects of the New Pension Reform Law, 1975 U. ILL. L. FORUM
143; Gunn, Participation and Vesting Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, 1975 U. ILL. L. FORUM 181; Herbert, Investment Regulation and Conflicts of Interest
in Employer-Managed Pension Plans, 17 B.C. Inn. & COM. L. REV. 127 (1976); Comment,
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: Policies and Problems, 26 SYR. L. REV.
539 (1975).
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tablished pension plans to provide the level of retirement income pub-
lic policy is felt to require. As the plans come closer to the ideal rather
than what employers or employees perceive as in their respective in-
terests, employers may have less interest in creating them.7 Therefore,
it is believed to be necessary to encourage sound programs by offer-
ing tax relief to those who establish them.'
The favorable treatment of pension plans under the Internal
Revenue Code is limited to so-called qualified plans—plans that do
not discriminate in favor of stockholders, officers, or other highly
compensated employees.9 This indicates that the purpose of the tax
subsidy is to encourage plans for lower paid individuals, who are the
ones unlikely to save on their own. The high paid employees are en-
couraged to provide for their retirement under arrangements which
also benefit the low paid group."
Prior to ERISA, it was not particularly difficult to defer taxation
of compensation until after retirement, but in exchange the employer
had to forego its tax deduction until the amount was included in the
income of the employee." In other words, if an employee earned
$100,000 in 1972 and the employer insisted on deducting the entire
$100,000 currently, the employee would have had to include $100,000
in his income within a short time after the end of 1972.12 If the em-
ployee arranged to defer tax on part of this compensation, to say 1980,
then the deduction for this part would similarly be delayed until
1980.13 Thus, compensation paid to employees is generally deductible
by the employer only if the employee will include the payment in in-
come at approximately the same time.
The only exception to this "matching" rule for compensation is
for pension and profit-sharing plans that 'qualify" under section 401
of the Internal Revenue Code. Contributions to such plans are deduc-
tible when made," while taxation to the employee is delayed until ac-
tual distribution" from the plan, most often after retirement.
7 See 26 SYR. L. REV., supra note 6, at 555.
SENATE REP., Ltipra note 4, at 18.
9 INT REV. CODE OF 1954, § 401(a)(4).
'° See Statement of Frederic W. Hickman. then Ass't Sec'y of the Treasury for
Tax Policy, from Pension and Profit Sharing Plans: The Quintessential Tax Shelter at 7,
before the 25TH NATL CONE. OF THE TAX FOUNDATION (Dec. 5, 1973).
" The employee must also be willing either to take a forfeitable interest (such
that his rights will be dependent on the performance of substantial future service) or to
rely upon the credit of the employer. If he gets security for vested rights (for example,
the employer makes deposits to a trust fund), then the employee will be immediately
taxable even though distribution is delayed. Ira. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§402(b), 83; Rev.
Rut. 60-31, 1960-1 CUM. BULL 174. See Section IV, Part A and Section VI, Part C, infra.
72 A short period of deferral will not prevent deduction under INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 162. Such payments are not deferred compensation. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 55-496,
1955-2 Cum. BuLt.. 531.
13 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §404(a)(5). But see Latrobe Steel Co., 62 T.C. 456, 469
(1974).
14 INT, REV, CODE OF 1954, §404(a)(1), (2), (3).
"Id. ta 402(4)(1).
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Deferral of taxation until after retirement can, of course, reduce
the tax if the worker will be in a lower tax bracket in his post-
retirement years. This is a possibility wherever compensation is de-
ferred. Under a qualified plan, however, there is an advantage—to
the parties—even when the tax bracket is not changed.
Thus, the mismatching of the employer deduction and the re-
porting of income enables the parties to increase the amount of
money in private hands. For 'example, if a corporation which normally
pays tax at the 48 percent rate earns $10,000, it can retain $5,200
after tax. If instead of keeping the $10,000, the corporation paid it to
Mr. Jones as compensation, Jones will be able to retain whatever por-
tion is left after payment of his taxes. If Jones is also in the 48 per-
cent bracket, he retains $5,200. The amount of money in private
hands is unchanged by the corporation's decision to pay Jones an
extra $10,000 in compensation.
On the other hand, if the $10,000 were contributed to a qual-
ified pension plan, the plan retains the full $10,000, thus increasing
the amount of money in private hands by $4,800. The Treasury does
not get this money until the plan distributes $10,000 to Jones (assum-
ing Jones remains in the 48 percent bracket at the time of distribu-
tion).
B. Purpose of ERISA
Concern for equity in the distribution of the tax burden should
have led to an examination of the amount of aid toward building a
nest egg for retirement which is provided through the tax relief just
described, as well as the number and income level of the workers re-
ceiving such aid.' 6
 But ERISA goes beyond the amendments to the
Internal Revenue Code contained in Title II of the Act. Title 1 of
ERISA regulates the terms and conditions of retirement programs,
even if special tax relief is not sought. While not an exact duplicate,
the provisions of Title I closely parallel those of Title 11.' 7
If the decision to establish a plan is purely voluntary, why should
there be any restriction on coverage or other conditions of operation?
One reason is obvious. Once an employer establishes a plan, an em-
ployee can be expected to rely on it to provide for his retirement. If
this reliance turns out to be unwarranted, the result can be cata-
18 See PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE PENSION PROGRAMS, A REPOR1"1 .0 TOE Pt:gnu:NT
ON PRIVATE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT PLANS ii (1965).
' 7 29 U.S.C, 11 1051-1061, Tit. I Subtitle B, Part 2 (Supp. IV, 1975) (Participa-
tion and Vesting) has its counterpart in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 11 401(a)(11), (12),
(13), (14), (15), (19), 410, 411, 414. 29 U.S.C. 111081-1086, Tit. 1 Subtitle 11, Part 3
(Funding) has its counterpart in INT. REV. CODE. OF 1954, 1 412. Title I also has provi-
sions relating to Reporting and Disclosure, ERISA 11 101-111, 29 U.S.C. 111 1021-1031
(Supp. IV, 1975) and Fiduciary Responsibility, ERISA 11 401-414, 29 U.S.C.
11 1101-1114 (Supp. IV, 1975). A detailed discussion of these latter provisions, which
also have parallels in the Internal Revenue Code, see, e.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954
II 4975, 6057, is beyond the scope of this Article.
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strophic, much worse than if the employee expected to fend for him-
self. Educating employees to plan on the assumption the benefit
might not be paid would defeat the purpose of private plans by caus-
ing double savings in many instances. Thus, ERISA is a kind of "truth
in pension" Act. Employers should not be allowed to promise a pen-
sion unless there is fairly good assurance the promise will be kept."
Thus, the success of ERISA can be measured by the answers to
the following questions:
I. Will employees working for companies that maintain retire-
ment programs be entitled to receive an annual benefit upon
retirement?' 9
2. Will funds be available to pay such pension? 2 °
3. What effect will ERISA have on the establishment and
maintenance by employers of adequate retirement programs? 2 '
4. Will workers who should not expect to receive an adequate
pension through their employment be apprised of this early enough
so they can save for retirement? 22
5. Will it be realistic to expect such savings to take place? 23
6. What is ERISA's effect on equity in the distribution of the tax
burden?"
II. COVERAGE OF EMPLOYEES IN ESTABLISHED PLANS
There are a multitude of reasons why employees of corporations
with retirement programs may have found themselves without a pen-
sion at the time of retirement. These may be roughly classified as fol-
lows:
1. The employee's attachment to the corporation was not
long enough, or it was sporadic rather than continuous.
2. The job classification in which the employee served was
not covered by the plan. It was common practice for
plans to differentiate between members of an affiliated
group of corporations, between separate divisions of one
corporation, and even between hourly and salary em-
ployees of one division. Furthermore, ordinarily part-
time or seasonal employees were not given pension
coverage.
3. The employee's salary was not high enough—the pen-
sion plan was "integrated" with social security and pro-
" The objective of ERISA is "to assure 'that American workers who are promised
retirement benefits will actually get what they have coming.'' Sen. Harrison J. Williams
(D.N.J.) as quoted in the Wall St. J., Aug. 28, 1974, at I, col. 6.
" See Section II infra.
"See Section III infra.
"See Section IV infra.
22 See Part A of Section V infra.
23 See Part B of Section V infra.
" See Section VI infra.
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vided benefits only on earnings not covered by social
security.
4. The employee was not willing to contribute to the plan,
or if he did contribute, to leave his money until retire-
ment. In certain cases, employees would have a choice of
current compensation, or a pension, and would choose
the former.
5. Distribution from the plan was in a lump sum on termi-
nation from service or otherwise, rather than in an an-
nuity or other installment after retirement.
Part A of this Section will discuss whether length of service
should be taken into account in determining the employee's right to a
pension, and if so, to what extent. Part B considers whether tax equity
requires that employers be precluded from making the distinctions
described in paragraphs 2 through 4 above. Part C discusses prospects
that an accumulated pension will actually provide income during re-
tirement. In summary, this section deals with the chances that em-
ployees of corporations that have established pension plans will be
entitled to receive an annual payment after retirement.
A. Employees' Attachment to the Corporation–Vesting
Vesting is the right of a plan participant to receive his accrued
benefits, even though his employment is terminated before he is eligi-
ble for retirement. Generally, this right was provided only under cer-
tain circumstances—after a specified period of service, upon attain-
ment of a specified age, or both, or upon specified types of termina-
tion. Thus, prior to ER1SA, many plans required employees to work
until age 55, or even age 60 or 65, in order to receive a pension. 25
Obviously, many employees were frustrated in their expectation
of a pension, and Title 1 seems intended to require that employees
receive what they reasonably expect." It is also conceivable that de-
layed vesting could result in an inequitable distribution of the tax ben-
efits of qualified plans. This would be the concern of the vesting pro-
" For summaries of congressional findings as to the conditions required for vest-
ing prior to ERISA, see, e.g., SENATE REI'..supra note 4, at 45; SENATE COMM. UN LABOR &
PUBLIC WELFARE, STATISTICAL. ANALYSIS OF MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE
PENSIONS, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in Panel Discussions on General Tax Reform Before
the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 7, at 1035 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Panel Discussions); SENATE COMM. ON LABOR & PUBLIC WELFARE.
SUBCOMM. ON LABOR, INTERIM REPORT OF ACTIVITIES OF THE PRIVATE WELFARE AND
PENSION PLAN STUDY 1971, S. REI'. No. 634, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1972).
26 Congress heard a number of "horror" stories From workers who were denied
pensions after long periods of service. See, e.g., 1971 INTERIM REPORT, Supra note 25, at
68. There are those who believed that the statistics used by Congress were outdated and
that the "horror" stories were the exception rather than the rule. Nevertheless, congres-
sional action was needed to deal with those plans that did not measure up. See Panel
Discussions, supra note 25, at 1089 (testimony of Prof. Dan M. McGill, Chairman of the
Pension Research Council, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania).
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visions of Title II—section 411 of the Internal Revenue Code.
I. Selection of Vesting Standard
(a) Factors to be considered
Some would argue for full and immediate vesting." The exis-
tence of an employer financed pension plan presumably causes wages
to be lower than they otherwise would be. The contribution to the
pension plan is really the employee's money and he should obtain it
eventually. Moreover, unless there is immediate vesting employees
who change jobs frequently cannot hope to build up an adequate pen-
sion. What can be said in opposition to this position?
Intentionally delaying vesting to reduce employee turnover and
labor mobility is presumably contrary to public policy." ERISA's sanc-
tion of so-called "class year plans" under which even long-service em-
ployees may always have a forfeitable interest in contributions for the
last five years" is unfortunate, particularly in the absence of any dis-
cussion of how public policy is served by such plans.3°
Very rapid vesting could be opposed on the grounds that ad-
ministrative costs would be unduly high in relation to the benefit. Al-
though the validity of this argument is uncertain, it seems nonetheless
clear that it would not justify the period of delay permitted by ERISA.
Some argued that vesting should not be mandated because it is
expensive. If money is paid out or set aside for people who leave be-
fore retirement, there will not be enough left for an adequate retire-
ment benefit for those who remain." Particularly in new plans it is
advisable to let the employer focus entirely on those close to retire-
ment, who need a pension most, rather than dissipating assets in favor
of terminating employees. Once the plan is in operation for a substan-
27 Remarks by Ralph Nader before the Association of Private Pension and Wel-
fare Plans, Inc. (1971); Hearings on Tax Proposals Affecting Private Pension Plans Before the
House Comm. on Ways & Means, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 847 (1972) (statement
submitted by Professor Barry Bressler) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
"See PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE PENSION PROGRAMS, A REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT ON PRIVATE EMPIOYEE RETIREMENT PLANS 40 (1965); Hearing on S. 3421 Before
Subcomm. on Labor of the Sen. Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare,  90th Cong., 2d Sess. 249
(statement of Thomas R. Donahue, Ass't Sec'y of Labor, Exhibit B). But see, FOLK,
PRIVATE PENSION AND LABOR MOBILITY, JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE. Ow AGE INCOME
ASSURANCE, PART IV: EMPLOYMENT ASPECTS OF PENSION PLANS, 90l11 Cong., 1st Sess. 132,
134-35 (1967).
29 ERISA § 203(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(c)(3) (Supp. IV, 1975); INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 411(d)(4).
The special treatment for class year plans apparently had its origins in the bills
developed by the Senate Comm. on Labor 8c Public Welfare. See RETIREMENT INCOME
SECURITY FOR EMPLOYEES An' Or 1973 S.4, S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 123
(1973) (§202(a)(3) of the bill).
3 I See Hearings, supra note 27, pt. 3, at 819 ("Benefit Plan Bulletin" prepared by
Johnson & Higgins).
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tial period of time, it will improve benefits and can then institute
vesting. 32 If people who assert that pensions are deferred wages are
correct, however, this is the equivalent of saying, "I can't pay B what
he has earned, because if I do, I would not have enough to pay A
what he needs to live." Employers sought to rebut the deferred wage
assertion by pointing out that contributions are generally not allocated
to particular employees." Rather, the assumption is that, due to mor-
tality and turnover, not everyone will collect a pension.
Although the reference to individual allocation is simplistic, this
reasoning does suggest what seems to be the most serious argument
for delayed vesting, namely, that perhaps the wage structure is such
that the cost of pensions is borne by long-service and older employees.
Younger employees, who do not think about retirement must be paid
their value in cash or they will not accept the job." It may also be
possible that the wage level of newel' employees would be too high if
it included a pension because the wage structure does not reflect
training costs. This excess could be recaptured on early termination of
employment through forfeiture of the pension.•
Furthermore, uncertainty about who actually bears the cost of
pensions could be resolved in favor of an age requirement for vesting,
on the theory that younger employees will get other jobs or will
otherwise be able to make arrangements for retirement." Some com-
panies do provide a pension, intended to permit a reasonable living
standard above subsistence, for employees with as little as 15 years of
set -vim:12 Moreover, even if an individual could not earn a full pen-
sion elsewhere, the loss of benefits based on his salary at age 25 or 35
will be relatively meaningless if wages are continually rising." The
pension earned in the last 20 years of employment will, assuming no
change in employment status, provide substantially all of his retire-
ment income. 3" Arguments such as these may have led the Nixon
12 Id. at 818.
aa See e.g., Hearings, supra note 27, pt. 3, at 593 (testimony of John A. Cardon on
behalf of Ad Hoc Corporate Pension Fund Committee).
84 McClung, The Economics of Pension Finance, 36 J. OF RISK & Ins. 425 (1969).
15 FOLK, supra note 28, at 145.
3° See Panel Discussions, supra note 25, at 1097 (statement of Dan M. McGill). An
objection to age related vesting is that it could cause employment discrimination against
older workers. See Hearings, supra note 27, pt. 2, at 404 (testimony of Andrew J. Biemil-
lee representing the AFL-CIO). But see id. pt. 1, at 74 (testimony of Edwin S. Cohen,
Ass't Sec), of the Treasury for 'Fax Policy).
Many plans have an alternative pension formula of say 40% of pay including
social security which will be payable to all employees with 15 or more years of service.
On the other hand, according to a recent survey, nearly 80% of all plans have no limit
on credited service and almost all give credit for at least 30 years. BANKERS TRUST CO.,
1975 STUDY OF CORPORATE: PENSION PLANS.
a" Hearings, supra note 27, pt. 2. at 431 (statement of Quentin I. Smith, Jr., Presi-
dent of Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, pension consultants).
a" An employee hired at age 25 at $5,000 per year, who receives a salary increase
of 4% to 7% per year and obtains new employment at age 35, 45 and 55 will probably
receive 70% to 80% of his accrued pension even if the pension earned in the first two
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Administration to propose a "rule of 50:" Fifty percent vesting at the
point where age and participation in the plan (which was delayed
until age 30 and 3 years of service) total 50 years, with the vested per-
centage increasing 10 percent a year for the next 5 years. 4 °
While the argument that age was significant always had some
appeal to me, I felt that the difference in treatment between older
and younger employees under the Administration proposal was too
great. The fact that full pensions are not normally earned after only
i5 or 20 years 4 I should make one wary of the argument that younger
people do not bear the cost of the plan. Moreover, even the loss of a
pension earned while young could be serious, particularly to those
who suffer a career setback and do not experience rapidly rising in-
come or steady employment. I had suggested that as a compromise,
50 percent vesting be required when an employee has completed 10
years of service or reaches age 45 after 5 years of service, whichever
comes first. 42
(b) Evaluating the ERISA Solution
ERISA resolved the debate over age as a factor in vesting by al-
lowing the employer a choice of whether to take age into account.
However, the age-related standard allows age to be considered to a
much lesser extent than its supporters desired.
A plan may adopt one of three minimum vesting schedules: 4 "
(i) A five-to-fifteen year "graded" vesting schedule,
under which an employee's accrued benefit will be 25
percent vested after five years' service, 50 percent
vested after 10 years' service and 100 percent after 15
years' service;
(ii) "Cliff" vesting under which an employee's accrued
benefit will be 100 percent vested after ten years' ser-
vice; or
(iii) A "rule of 45" under which the accrued benefit of an
jobs were forfeited. Some believed that this problem could be alleviated by the transfer
of a sum equal to the value of the employee's accrued benefit to a central fund. See S.
REP., supra note 4, 71-78 (description of "Portability"). This would work only if inflation
caused the value of the fund to grow sufficiently to keep pace with increases in salary.
"See Message from President Richard M. Nixon (Dec. 8, 1971) reprinted in
Hearings, supra note 27, pt. I, at 6, 9. Since the Nixon proposal permitted all service
prior to age 30 to be excluded, vesting would not have been required prior to age 40
even if a person began work at age 18 and had 21 years of service at age 39. Further,
since the first 3 years of service could be excluded, under the proposal full vesting
could not occur prior to age 45 with at least 18 years of service at that point. Explana-
tion of H.R. 12272, The "Individual Retirements Benefits Act of 1971," id. at 23, 24-25.
"See note 37 supra.
"See Panel Discussions, supra note 25, at 1135 (statement of Daniel Halperin).
' 3 ERISA §203(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2) (Supp. IV, 1975); 1N-r. REV. CODE or
1954. § 411(a)(2).
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employee with five or more years of service will be 50
percent vested when his age and years of service equal
45, and another 10 percent will vest in each of the fol-
lowing five years. However, tinder this schedule the
benefits of an employee with 10 years of service must
be at least 50 percent vested and an additional 10 per-
cent must vest for each additional year of service.
In sum, ERISA requires full vesting after a period of service no
longer than 15 years. This can occur on an all-or-nothing basis after
10 years of service. The price of delaying full vesting 5 more years is
the institution of partial vesting beginning after 5 years of service
either at 25 percent for all employees under the first alternative, or at
50 percent only for older workers under the "rule of 45." Can this be
considered a successful solution to the vesting problem?
If the goal is relatively universal coverage by the private retire-
ment system, it would seem that the period of service required before
vesting takes effect should be short enough to make it likely that any
employee who has an average experience in changing jobs will earn
vested benefits for at least a significant portion of his working career.
However, this goal is hard to reconcile with a voluntary system which
permits an employer not to have a plan unless he so chooses. Vesting
seems required under a voluntary system only to avoid hardship to
those who did not understand the conditions for vesting and relied on
the plan to their detriment. This rationale might suggest that once a
significant accrued benefit has been earned under a plan, it should
not be lost for lack of vesting. The only alternative would be to im-
prove the information to employees so that they will more fully un-
derstand the risks they are taking. 44 It was stated above that the pur-
pose of the private pension system would be defeated if employees
covered by plans had to save as if no pension would be forthcoming. 45
However, this is less of a problem if those who forfeit benefits are
younger employees who did not have their wages reduced because of
the existence of a plan, at least if during the period of accrual they
would not have ordinarily saved fbr retirement. Retirement savings
for these people would come later on in life either from an employer
plan or individually. Vesting would be required only for benefits ac-
crued during the period when savings for retirement can be expected
and are reflected in the wage structure.
Tax relief, however, represents the expenditure of public funds
and it is reasonable to insist that the beneficiaries of such funds act in
a manner consistent with public policy. Vesting, prior to retirement,
has always been insisted upon by the Internal Revenue Service when
and to the extent it felt it to be necessary to prevent a plan from dis-
" See Section V, Part A, infra.
"See text at note 18 supra.
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criminating in favor of higher paid employees." Insertion of a
specific vesting standard into the Code could indicate that the ad-
ministrative practice was insufficient to secure adequate pension
coverage for low paid workers or that tax equity requires extension of
the benefits provided by qualified plans to shorter-service employees
whether or not these people are earning less than longer-service
workers. It seems reasonable to assume that we are trying through the
tax law to provide protection for people who would not indepen-
dently save. Thus, the right question may be—is the accrued benefit
important in providing for the individual's retirement? Or at least,
does the wise expenditure of tax funds depend upon the "purchase"
of that benefit? If so, vesting should be required.
These are matters of judgment which I might hesitate to exer-
cise even if I had all the data I would desire at my disposal. Certainly,
in the absence of more complete information as to how wages are set
and the appropriate period for retirement savings, it is difficult to
evaluate ERISA's achievement. I believe, however, that ERISA falls
short of the ideal. Employees hired at advanced ages are certainly
going to be within the appropriate period for retirement savings be-
fore 10 years have passed. Younger workers are likely to reach this
stage within 15 years. Nevertheless, in defense of the legislation it
should be noted that ERISA compares favorably with the vesting
standard urged by any Administration or legislative committee which
studied the issue in depth." These groups may. have been proposing
what they believed to be "practical" rather than "ideal." This suggests
that Congress may be prepared to provide greater protection if the
proper case can be made.
4° See text at note 48 infra.
47 1965: The President's Committee on Corporate Pension Funds recommended
50% vesting after 15 years of service with full vesting after 20 years. PUBLIC POLICY AND
PRIVATE PENSION PROGRAMS. A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON PRIVATE EMPLOYEE
RETIREMENT PI.ANS 42.
1968: The Inter-Agency Task Force which produced the 1965 Report was recon-
stituted and developed a bill sponsored by the Department of Labor, S. 3421 intro-
duced on May 2, 1968. This bill provided for full vesting with 10 years of continuous
service after age 25. See Hearings on S. 3421 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on
Labor & Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 2d.Sess. 220-21 (statement of Thomas R. Donahue,
Ass't Sec'y of Labor).
1971: S. 2 introduced by Senator Javits-10% vesting after six years of plan serv-
ice, increasing 10% per year to full vesting after 15 years of participation.
1971: Nixon Administration recommends rule of 50. See note 40 supra.
1973: S. 4 as reported by the Committee on Labor & Public Welfare provided
for 30% vesting after 8 years of plan service increasing 10% per year to full vesting
after 15 years of participation. See 202(a)(I) of the bill. S. REP. No.127, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 122 (1973).
Moreover, many of these proposals had transitional rules far longer than that
permitted under ERISA.
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(c) Vesting and Discrimination
(i) Prior Law
As stated above, favorable tax treatment for qualified plans is
supported as a means of developing pension coverage for a wide
range of employees who otherwise might not be expected to have
adequate savings. Thus, the Internal Revenue Code requires that
plans not discriminate in favor of the higher paid. Obviously, this dis-
crimination could occur in practice even under plans in which all em-
ployees participated, if there were more rapid turnover among the
low paid group and the vesting standard was such that fewer low paid
employees actually qualified for a pension. Accordingly, the Internal
Revenue Service insisted that "vesting provisions in a qualified plan
... not result in the discrimination prohibited by ... the Code," as de-
termined by the facts in each case. 48
According to the Conference Committee Report on ERISA, "the
law in this area has been administered on a case-by-case basis without
uniform results in fact situations of a similar nature."48 One witness,
who agreed with this statement, testified that in Delaware closely-held
companies were often required to provide full vesting after 5 years of
employment. 5" Practitioner complaints about this lack of uniformity
were apparently widespread."
Instead of trying to develop procedures to assure more uniform
treatment, the Treasury asked Congress to impose limits on its discre-
tion to require vesting in order to prevent discrimination. Under the
original Administration proposal full vesting could not be required in
less than 6 years, for employees hired at age 35 or later, and could
take much longer for younger employees, for example 12 years, if the
age at hire were 25. 52
(ii) The Effect of ERISA
The Code now provides that compliance with the minimum vest-
ing standard of ERISA, even though it is much less stringent than
4° Rev. Rul. 71-151, 1971-I Cum. Butt 123.
40 Employee Retirement Income Act of 1974, H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 276 (1974).
" Panel Discussions, supra note 25, at 1152 (testimony of Converse Murdoch).
51 See SENATE REP. „Supra note 4, at 47.
" See Explanation of H.R. 12272, reprinted in Hearings, supra note 27, at 27.
The strictest vesting standards permitted were those imposed on plans benefitting self-
employed individuals who are owner-employees. Id, at 31. This was a "rule of 35" so
that 50% vesting would be required when age plus participation equals 35 with full vest-
ing 5 years later. Id. at 30. Employees hired at age 35 would become participants after 1
year, id. at 28, and would be 50% vested immediately leading to full vesting after 6
years. Employees hired at age 25 would become participants after 3 years. Id. At age
32, 7 years after hire, such employees would have 4 years of participation and would be
50% vested. Full vesting would come at age 37.
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that previously required by the IRS, would be sufficient to satisfy any
anti-discrimination test unless:
(A) there has been a pattern of abuse under the plan
(such as a dismissal of employees before their accrued
benefits become non-forfeitable) 53 tending to dis-
criminate in favor of employees who are officers,
shareholders or highly compensated, or
(B) there have been, or there is reason to believe there
will be, an accrual of benefits or forfeitures tending to
discriminate in favor of employees who are officers,
shareholders or highly compensated. 54
This last provision could be interpreted to describe prior prac-
tice, thus rendering the amendment totally innocuous. However, the
Committee Report states:
[E]xcept in cases where actual misuse of the plan occurs in
operation, the Internal Revenue Service is directed not to
require a vesting schedule more stringent than 40 percent
vesting after 4 years of employment with 5 percent addi-
tional vesting for each of the next 2 years, and 10 percent
additional vesting for each of the following five years. Also,
this more rapid vesting would generally not be required ex-
cept in a case where the rate of likely turnover for officers,
shareholders or highly compensated employees was sub-
stantially less (perhaps as much as 50 percent less) than the
rate of likely turnover for rank-and-file employees. ... It
generally is not intended that any plan (or successor plan of
a now existing plan) which is presently under a more rapid
vesting schedule should be permitted to cut back its vesting
schedule as a result of this statements'
The Internal Revenue Service first announced in Revenue Pro-
cedure 75-49 that in the absence of so-called "4-40 vesting", the most
stringent the Conference Report would permit, it would not issue ad-
vance determination letters as to compliance with the non-
discrimination requirement if the turnover rate of the rank-and-file
employees was more than 6 percent per year and more than 200 per-
cent of the turnover rate of the so-called "prohibited group"
(shareholders, officers and highly paid)." However, "comments re-
ceived by the Service suggest(ed) that a large number of employers
may not" be able to meet the turnover test and thus would be forced
53 Title I makes it unlawful to discharge a participant "for the purpose of inter-
fering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled
under the plan." ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (Supp. IV, 1975).
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 411(d)(1).
55 H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 276-77 (1974).
56 Rev. Proc. 75-49, 1975 INT. REV. BULL No. 48. at 34.
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to adopt "4-40 vesting."" Responding to these complaints, the Inter-
nal Revenue Service announced it was reconsidering its position and
that meanwhile applicants for advance determination letters could
demonstrate compliance with the non-discrimination standard on the
basis of a prior favorable ruling or by application of the facts and cir-
cumstances test utilized by the Service prior to ERISA." The Internal
Revenue Service also stated that it would not require a vesting
schedule more rapid than "4-40 vesting" unless there is a pattern of
abuse under the plan."
It appears from the controversy surrounding the issuance of Rev-
enue Procedure 75-49 that application of the turnover test suggested
in the Committee Report could lead to imposing 4-40 vesting as a
minimum standard in almost all cases. This would be substantially
more stringent than the statutory tests of ERISA. On the other side, if
4-40 vest,in were the maximum, many closely-held companies would be
able tcA .! then the period for vesting over what had previously been
required by the Service. The latest Internal Revenue Service pro-
nouncement indicates that, despite the Committee report language to
the contrary, it would allow such plans to be amended.
(iii) Evaluation
It should go without saying that it would be ironic for an "Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act" to be the vehicle for dilution of
protection heretofore afforded by administrative practice. Uniformity
in treatment throughout the country is a worthwhile goal but it is a
poor excuse for denial of vesting to the extent previously required.
Nor is there much of an argument that prior practice discriminated
against small corporations. Shorter vesting periods in owner-
dominated plans are justified by the fact that the owner himself is
"immediately" vested in his benefit, since he controls the business and
thereby is virtually certain to remain employed as long as the business
is in existence. Thus, use of 4-40 vesting as a maximum is outrageous
and "legislation" by Committee report makes it even more so. It
would seem that any attempt by a corporation to lengthen its vesting
standard, or adoption of 4-40 vesting by similarly situated companies,
should provide a perfect test for the new procedure whereby an aft
fected employee can ask the Tax Court for a declaration that the In-
ternal Revenue Service issuance of a favorable determination letter to
the employer was improper."
5 ' T.I.R. 1424 (Dec. 9, 1975), 6 P-1-1 1976 Emu. TAxEs1154816.
" Rev. Proc. 76.11, 1976 IN I'. REV. BULL No. 9, at 22. See also T.I.R. 1441 (Feb.
2, 1976), 6 P-li (1976) FEU. TAxEs1154976.
5° Rev. Proc. 76-11, Sec. 3.04, 1976 INT. REV. Butt.. No. 9, at 22, 23.
6° INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, * 7476. To the extent ERISA will shorten the period
of service required for eligibility it will have a cost impact for plans which already have
5-year vesting. More short-service employees will earn a vested benefit. Those plans
which are funded by individual insurance contracts may suffer an increased cost due to
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Applicaton of 4-40 vesting as a minimum raises more difficult
questions. As indicated above, I believe ERISA's vesting provisions do
not assure equity in the distribution of tax relief for retirement sav-
ings. Nevertheless, the specific rules of ERISA would seem to repre-
sent current congressional judgment concerning the requirement of
tax equity, at least as between short and long service employees. Con-
gress did indicate a concern that the statutory rules might not offer
sufficient protection against discrimination in favor of the highly-paid.
This may, however, have been in the context of non-interference with
prior practice of the Internal Revenue Service rather than a sugges-
tion that new standards be applied. Moreover, Congress directed a
study of the interrelationship of the vesting and anti-discrimination
requirements6' and requested the Treasury to supply information
with respect to "patterns of benefit loss for different categories of
plans ... under the minimum vesting schedules prescribed"" by
ERISA.
In these circumstances, it seems difficult to interpret ERISA as
requiring a large number of plans to adopt more stringent vesting
than that previously demanded by the Internal Revenue Service or
specifically required by statute. Certainly, the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice should not become more lenient and it should be more diligent
than it has been in uncovering unusual disparities in turnover be-
tween the rank-and-file and highly paid groups. Moreover, I would
not want to suggest that ERISA precludes more stringent rules
across-the-board if, as the outcry to Revenue Procedure 75-49 indi-
cates, the Internal Revenue Service was not sufficiently vigilant in
preventing substantial discrimination against the rank-and-file.
Nevertheless, Congress stated it wanted the matter studied, which
would dictate that if the legislature is not the appropriate forum at
least the more formal process required for the adoption of regulations
should be utilized."
2. Protection of a Vesting Standard
(a) Computation of Vested Benefit
A full vesting of accrued benefit after no longer than 15 years of
service would be an empty achievement if the benefit being earned
during that period had no relation to the amount paid to those who
stayed on until retirement.
ERISA permits the plan to base the benefit upon participation in
the plan, but, in general, only allows an employee to be excluded
the from-end load on contracts which are cancelled without providing vested benefits.
6' ER1SA § 3022(a)(1), 29 U.S.C.* 1222(a)(1) (Supp. IV, 1975).
62 H.R. REP. No, 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 277 (1974).
T.I.R. 1441, supra note 58, states that any new general guidelines "will be pub-
lished first in proposed form with full opportunity for public comment."
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from the plan for a relatively short time, no more than 18 months
after date of hire or 6 months after attainment of age 25, whichever
comes later. 14
The Act seeks to insure that the benefit will be earned fairly rat-
ably over the period of participation, and not too heavily in the years
immediately preceding retirement."" An analysis of these provisions is
beyond the scope of this article, but I venture an uncertain opinion
that the vesting standard has not been significantly compromised by
permitting the benefit earned in the later years of employment to be
substantially greater than the benefit earned while young.
It is disturbing, however, that plans to which employees contrib-
ute do not appear to require ratable accrual of the benefit derived
from employer contributions." Apparently, it is possible to arrange
employee contributions so that the employee pays for all or a large
part of the benefit in the initial years of employment."' Although the
employee would be 100 percent vested in his own contributions, he
would have little or no rights to amounts set aside by the employer.
(b) Measuring the Period of Service—Continuity
Under ERISA an employee is credited with a year of service for
vesting purposes for any calendar or other plan year in which he has
1,000 hours of service" Certain years may be disregarded, namely:
(i) Years of service completed before the employee attains
age 22;"
(ii) Periods for which the employee failed to contribute to a
plan requiring employee contributions;"
04 ERISA *202(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. 	 1052(a)(4) (Stipp. IV, 1975); INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, *410(a)(4), requires participation to begin no later than 6 months after the
employee first satisfies the eligibility conditions. Under ERISA *202(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C.
*1052(a)(1)(A) (Stipp. IV, 1975), INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 410(a)(I)(A), the general
eligibility conditions are age 25 and I year of service. ERISA *202(a)(1)(13), 29. U.S.C.
*1052(a)(1)(B) (Stipp. IV, 1975), INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, *410(a)(1)(B) permits more
stringent eligibility conditions for certain plans which have very rapid vesting.
ERISA § 204, 29 U.S.C. § 1054 (Stipp. IV, 1975); Imr. REV. CODE or 1954,
§ 411(1)).
"" ERISA § 204(c)(2), (3), 29 U.S.C. § I054(c)(2), (3) (Supp. IV 1975); INT. REV.
CODE or 1954, § 411(c).
6I For example, the cost of a benefit equal to 1% of current compensation is, as-
suming an 8% interest rate, less than I% or pay for an employee age 40. Assuming a
5% interest rate it is still less than 2% of pay for an employee aged 35. (These computa-
tions assume no turnover and use the 1951 Group Annuity Mortality Table.)
"" ERISA *203(6)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(b)(2)(A) (Supp. IV, 1975); INT. REV.
CODE or 1954, *411(a)(5)(A).
""ERISA *203(6)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. *1053(b)(1)(A) (Supp. IV, 1975); INT. REV.
CODE or 1954, *411(a)(4)(A).
'"ERISA *203(b)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. 	 1053(b)(1)(13) (Supp. IV, 1975); INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 411(a)(4)(13).
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(iii) Periods in which no employee accrues benefits under
the plan. 7 '
In addition, in certain circumstances service must be continuous
to be fully counted." Under the so-called "rule of parity," non-vested
participants lose all claim to their prior service once they have been
away from the employer for a consecutive period equal to their prior
service." Further, in the case of profit-sharing, money-purchase and
certain plans funded by insurance contracts, years of service following
a one-year break-in-service do not have any impact on the vesting of
accrued benefits earned prior to the break.'"
The only argument for delayed vesting which could justify ig-
noring periods prior to the time the plan came into existence or dur-
ing which the employee declines to contribute is the claim that vesting
should not be required for small amounts because administrative costs
would outweigh the benefit to the employee. On balance, this seems
an insufficient justification.
In the absence of ERISA, many employees were surprised to
learn they were not entitled to a pension because of their failure to
meet very stringent requirements as to continuity of service." These
rules were confusing to employees and could certainly interfere with
reasonable expectations. Moreover, aside from the possible difficulty
of maintaining records, it is hard to justify any requirement that serv-
ice be continuous. The size of the accrued benefit for a given period
of service can be the same whether or not the service is continuous.
Conceivably the effect of the existence of the pension on current
wages or the relationship between current wages and value of work
will not be affected by a break-in-service unless it is so long that the
two periods of work are totally unconnected. Thus, ERISA obviously
had to have some restrictions on plan requirements for continuous
service. The rule of parity may strike a reasonable balance between
the need to prevent employee confusion and the employer's ability to
7 ' The rule is stated in terms of years of service for periods during which the
employer does not maintain the plan. ERISA §203(b)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(b)(1)(C)
(Supp. IV, 1975); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §411(a)(4)(C). An employer is treated as
maintaining a plan if any employee accrues benefits. ERISA § 204(1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1054(f)(Supp. IV, 1975).
72 ERISA §203(b)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(b)(1)(D) (Supp. IV, 1975); INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 411(a)(4)(D).
73 ERISA § 203(b)(3)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(b)(3)(D) (Supp. IV, 1975); INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 411  (a)(6)(D).
ERISA §203(b)(3)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(b)(3)(C) (Supp. IV, 1975); INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, §411(a)(6)(C). A one-year break-in-service is a calendar or other plan
year during which the participant does not complete more than 500 hours of service.
ERISA §203(b)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(b)(3)(A) (Supp. IV, 1975); INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 4I 1(a)(6)(A).
"See, e.g., Hearings on S. 3921, supra note 47, at 242-43 (Exhibit A-I3); Hearings
on Examination of Private Welfare and Pension Plans Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Sen.
Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 116 (1971) (Letter date April 6,
1971). See, Comment, The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1979: Policies and
Problems, 26 SvR. L. Rev. 539, 563 (1975).
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maintain records of prior employment with the corporation or any
affiliate." Nevertheless, a change should be considered if and when a
recordkeeping difficulty cannot be substantiated.
Employers presumably sought the right to freeze any forfeiture
of accrued benefits under defined contributions plans at the time of
separation from service, even if the employee returns to the job, be-
cause the separate accounts for each participant, required under such
plans," made it difficult to resurrect prior funding for the forfeited
benefit. In the case of a profit-sharing plan, amounts forfeited were
probably credited to the accounts of other participants." Under
money-purchase plans, forfeitures would reduce future employer con-
tributions, as they would under any defined benefit pension plan."
Unlike defined benefit plans, however, money purchase plans might
require an immediate additional contribution equal to the prior forfei-
ture in order to restore the account' balance of the returning em-
ployee.
Nevertheless, it might have been better to seek ways and means
to alleviate the employer's possible funding difficulty rather than to
deprive the-employee of benefits. Nor does a profit-sharing plan pro-
vide a more appealing case for forfeiture unless it is believed to be
important to encourage allocation of forfeitures to the accounts of the
remaining participants." If forfeitures under a profit-sharing plan
are applied to reduce future employer contributions, as they may
be," the situation does not differ from that of a money-purchase
plan.
(c) Obtaining the Vested Benefit
Under ERISA, unless a participant otherwise elects, payments of
a benefit must begin shortly after the latest of age 65, the tenth an-
niversary of the commencement of participation, or the termination
of service." If the plan provides for an early retirement benefit, em-
ployees who terminate after having satisfied the service requirement
for early retirement must be granted the right to receive benefits at
the early retirement age.
78 See PRIVATE PENSION TAX REFORM, H.R. REP. NO. 779, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16
(1974) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REP.]. •
"For a description of defined contribution plans, see, Section III, Part A infra.
78 See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-4(a)(I)(iii) (1963).
7° Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)( 1)0) (1972).
• The President's Comm. on Corporate Pension Funds recommended that re-
allocation of forfeitures be prohibited because of the danger that "all contributions may
ultimately redound to the benefit of a relatively few long-term employees." Punic
POLICY AND PRIVATE PENSION PROGRAMS, A REPORT TO TIlE PRESIDENT ON PRIVATE
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT PLANS 68 (1965).
HI Rev. Rul. 71-313, 1971-2 Cum. Butt 203.
• ERISA § 206(a), 29 U.S.C. § I056(a) (Supp. IV, 1975); IN't REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 40100(14).
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Protection against a participant losilig track of a vested benefit is
provided by coordination with the Social Security system. The em-
ployer is required to supply data to the Social Security Administration
whenever an employee separates from service with a vested benefit."
When a person files for benefits, the Social Security Administration
will give him any information it has concerning his right to a private
pension."
A plan also is required to establish a procedure by which an em-
ployee can protest the denial of benefits." If an employee is not able
to obtain satisfaction, he is given the right to sue the plan as an entity
in the Federal courts." The Secretary of Treasury and the Secretary
of Labor may intervene in such action."
B. Coverage and Tax Equity
1. Prior Law
As stated above, in order to qualify for the special tax benefits, a
plan ordinarily has to establish that the classification established for
participation," and the benefits or contributions," do not discrimi-
nate in favor of employees who were officers, shareholders, super-
visors or highly compensated. Under this test a reasonable classifica-
tion would be acceptable, if it meets the so-called broad cross-section
test." The test appears to require that there not be an excessive dis-
parity between the percentage of company employees within any
low-earnings bracket and the percentage of employees in the plan in
the same bracket."' Nevertheless, prior to ERISA, it was possible to es-
tablish a qualified plan that excluded part-timers, seasonal employees,
hourly workers, employees who failed to contribute and those who
earned below the Social Security limit. In combination, this could re-
sult in a fairly effective exclusion of low-income workers.
An alternative to non-discriminatory classification is a showing
83 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6057. Although this provision appears only in the
Internal Revenue Code, it applies to all plans to which Title I applies, qualified or not.
H.R. REP. NO. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 385 (1974).
84 ERISA § 1032 adding § 1131 to the Social Security Act. (42 U.S.C. § 1131).
" ERISA § 503, 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (Supp. IV, 1975). The Senate bill required all
plans to establish an arbitration procedure. § 691 of H.R. 4200 as passed by the Senate
on September 19, 1973.
86 ERISA § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (Supp. IV, 1975).
87 ERISA § 502(h), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(h) (Supp. IV, 1975).
88 Prior to ERISA, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 401(a)(3)(B) now INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, §410(b)(1)(11).
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 401(a)(4). ERISA removed supervisory employees
from the prohibited group unless they were also officers, shareholders or highly com-
pensated.
"See SEN. COMM. ON FINANCE, PRIVATE PENSION PLAN REFORM, S. REP. NQ 383,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 41-42, 44 (1973).
"Temp. Treas. Reg. § 11.410(b)-(1)(d)(2). Compare Rev. Rul. 70-200, 1970-1 Cum
BULL 101, With Rev. Rul. 74-255, 1974-1 CUM. BULL 93 and Rev. Rul. 74-256, 1974-1
CUM. Bun. 94.
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that the plan covers more than 70 percent of the employees of the
company." Prior to ERISA, in determining whether a plan covered
the required percentage, it was permissible to ignore those whose cus-
tomary employment was not more than 20 hours per week or five
months in any calendar year." Such employees and probably even
those who worked more regularly, but still less than full-time, were
generally excluded from coverage without difficulty under the
reasonable classification test." 4
It was also common practice to limit a plan so that it did not ex-
tend to all divisions of a corporation." Such a plan would certainly
qualify if the covered divisions did not have a disproportionate
number of higher paid employees, and it may even have been accept-
able without examination of this issue. If the "divisions" were actually
separately incorporated, it was fairly certain that a plan which covered
all employees of one affiliate would automatically qualify."" Many cor-
porations were able to have a richer plan for top management, if by
accident or design such people were employed by a "management"
corporation.
Under section 401(a)(5) of the Code, a plan is not considered
discriminatory "merely because it is limited to salaried or clerical em-
ployees." This has been construed to mean that restricting plans to
salaried employees is neither per se had nor per se good."' It depends
upon whether the salary levels of the covered employees is a fair
cross-section of the corporation as a whole.
Another means to give lower paid employees relatively less ben-
efits or entirely exclude them from a qualified plan is provided by
integrating such plans with Social Security." In general, this permits
the employer to treat 50 percent of the Social Security benefit—the
part financed by employer contributions—as part of his plan."" For
example, the benefit formula may be 50 percent of pay reduced by 83
percent of the primary Social Security benefit.'" Other plans provide
a plan benefit only on average earnings on which the employee can-
not expect a payment from Social Security.'"' For low income people
this approach will mean little or no benefit from the private plan. For
high income individuals the Social Security offset will have relatively
little effect.
Finally, tax qualification will not be withheld from a plan which
12 INT. REV. OWE OF 1954, § 410(1)0)(A).
" a Former INT, R EV. ConE or 1954, § 40100(3)(A).
"But see Rev. Rul. 73-283, 1973-2 CUM. Rm.. 133.
9 ' See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-3(d) (1971).
°° See Floustiltm.supra note 76, at 49.
`" See Guides far Qualification of Pension, Profit-Sharing and Stock Bonus Plans, IRS,
PUB. No. 788, pt. 4m, at 15 (Feb. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Guides for Qualification].
"INT. REV. ConE or IRK § 401(a)(5). Treas. Reg. 1.401-3(e)(1971).
"" Treas. Reg. § 1.401-3(e)(2)(6(c)(1971).
'"° Rev. Rul. 71-446, 1971-2 CUM. Bum,. 187 § 7 (Offset Plans).
"See Rev. Rul. 71-446, 1971-2 CUM. Bum.. 187, §§ 3.02, 5.
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denies coverage to employees who decline to contribute as long as the
contribution level is not so high as to make it prohibitive for low in-
come employees. 1 02
2. Effect of ERI A
(a) Improvements in Coverage
Part-time and seasonal employees must be included in the plan
and given benefi s for any. year in which they work 1,000 hours. 10°
Further, all employees of an affiliated group are considered employed
by one employer. 04 The Committee Reports suggest that a plan for a
separate division or subsidiary could not qualify unless the broad
cross-section test is satisfied.'" It seems arguable, however, that if the
separate group is not an artificial segregation of management or other
personnel, but represents a separate functional unit which can be split
1off without shifti g of employees, the plan should be approved. In
any event, under ERISA it will be impossible to segregate executives
of an operating c mpany into a separate corporation in order to pro-
vide a richer benefit, or to take advantage of such a segregation
adopted for valid business purposes.
1;Moreover, hile employers can still require employee contribu-
tions as a conditi n for participation and may even have been given
some positive encouragement to continue such practice,'°° ERISA, on
balance, has probably reduced the chances that an employee will be
given a choice whether to participate or not. The main obstacle to
the increase of contributory plans would seem to be the unfavorable
tax treatment of employee contributions. Such contributions cannot be
deducted even if required as a condition of employment, let alone a
condition for benefits. 10 ' Employers tried to circumvent this difficulty
by adopting so-called "salary-reduction plans" under which the em-
ployee could chooie participation in the plan by accepting a decrease in
salary. It was intended that the money provided by the salary decrease
would still be considered an employer contribution. The Internal Rev-
enue Service posi ion on salary reduction plans was uncertain,'" but
'°' Treas. Reg. 1.401-3(d) (1971); Guides for Qualification, supra note 97, pt 4g,
at 13-14.
'" INT. REV. CODE: OF 1954, §4 410(a)(3)(A), 411 (b)(3).
104 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 414(b), (c).
05 HOUSE REr...chpra note 76, at 49-50; SEN. REP.,supra note 90, at 43-44.
'° 6 See text at n4tes 66 and 70 supra.
"'See Treasury Explanation of H.R. 12272, reprinted in Hearings on Tax Proposals
Affecting Private Pension Plans Before the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 92d Cong., 2c1
Sess., pt. 3, at 27, 31-32 (1972). Compare Rev. Rul. 72-250, 1972-1 CUM. Rms.22.
108 The Service for a limited period granted favorable rulings to such plans but
on December 6, 1972 issued proposed regulations which would have considered con-
tributions to salary reduction plans to be employee contributions. See statement of
Frederic W. Hickman, then Ass't Sec'y of the Treasury for Tax Policy, from Pension and
Profit Sharing Plans: The Quintessential Tax Shelter 16-17, before the 25th NATI. CONF. OF
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the Service has long permitted a choice between contributions to a
plan and immediate receipt of a "bonus" without taxation of those
who chose deferral. The only requirement was that one-half of the
participants in the deferral plan be from the lower 2/3 of eligible
employees.'"
Under ER1SA, at least until January 1, 1977, if a new arrange-
ment is established which gives an employee a choice between current
salary and a contribution to a qualified plan, the contribution is
deemed to have been made by the employee and is currently
taxable."° Since the employer has clearly indicated its willingness to
make a cash payment, it is reasonable to consider the employee to
have constructively received the salary and to have made the contribu-
tion himself. If made permanent, this rule would effectively preclude
salary reduction plans except to the limited extent of contributions to
Individual Retirement Accounts, as discussed in Section V of this arti-
cle.
In instances where employees do make contributions to con-
tributory plans, ERISA affords new protection."' Once an employee
is 50 percent vested, employer contributions for his benefit cannot be
forfeited merely because he chooses to withdraw his own contribu-
tions on separation from service or otherwise."2 If the employee is
less than 50 percent vested, forfeiture is permissible, but the plan
must permit the employee to retrieve his benefit by repayment of his
contributions.' 3
(b) Noise But No Results
ERISA has very little impact on the integration of plans with So-
cial Security. It extended the administrative practice of precluding
changes in the benefit due to improvements in Social Security follow-
ing the beginning of the pay-out period,"4 to encompass any
improvements following separation from service."5 Thus, the plan
benefit promised to the employee at the time of retirement or other
THE TAX FouNnivrioN (Dec. 5, 1973); 37 Fed, Reg. 24938 (1972).
Rev. Rut. 56-497, 1956-2 Cum. Bolt. 284.
ER1SA *2006. This rule does not apply to employees of tax-exempt organiza-
tions and public schools. INT. REV. CODE Or 1954, * 403(b). There is no logical justifica-
tion for this discrimination. See PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE PENSION PROGRAMS, A
REPORT 10 'IRE PRESIDENT ON PRIVATE. Ent PLOYEE RETIREMENT PLANE 61. It is perhaps not
clear whether this provision applies to a one-time irrevocable choice to participate or
not.
"I Under defined benefit plans, employee contributions must be credited with
interest. INT. REV. CODE or 1954, *411(c)(2)(C).
In INT. REV. CODE cm- 1954, *401(a)(19).
"3 Id. § 411(a)(3)(D)(i), 90•
"4 Rev. Rul. 71-446, 1971-2 C1)7%1.94;1.1. 187. See § 3.02 as to excess plans and *7
as to offset plans.
"5 INT. REV. CODE or 1954, *401(a)(15); ERISA 206(b), 29 U.S.C.
	 1056(6)
(Supp. IV, 1975).
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termination of employment will remain fixed regardless of subsequent
changes in Social Security.
The conference bill" 6 originally provided that, until July 1, 1976
(approximately 2 years after the passage of ERISA), pension plans
could -not increase their level of integration with Social Security to
take account of post-1971 Amendments to the Social Security Act. Al-
though the conferees expressed concern and indicated they expected
to study the matter in the period ahead, the conference restriction on
integration was deleted by a concurrent resolution, after a vigorous
telegram compaign." 7
Finally, salaried-only plans may have become easier to establish.
ERISA permits eiMployees in a bargaining unit to be disregarded in
determining whether a plan discriminates in favor of the higher
paid.'" It is claimed that unions often prefer other benefits to pen-
sions and if this free choice is made, there is no reason, particularly
when industry-wide bargaining is involved, to limit the pension of
employees outside the bargaining unit to the level desired by the
union."" If all hourly employees are unionized, ERISA removes all
obstacles to a salaried plan.
3. Evaluation of ERISA
(a) Tax Qualification
As stated above, the only reasonable explanation of the special
tax treatment for qualified plans is their use as a means of forced re-
tirement savings for those who are not sufficiently motivated to pro-
vide for themselves. To maintain their current standard of living,
lower paid individuals need at least as large a portion of pre-
retirement income than the well-to-do, if not more.n" On the other
hand, employers appear to believe that high-paid employees wish a
greater portion of their compensation to be deferred. If an equal
proportion is contributed to a retirement plan for the lower-paid, the
latter will not fully appreciate it and the entire cost could not be re-
flected in the wage level. Thus, many employers simply do what they
16 § 1022(g). See H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 131, 280-81. (1974).
The Senate Bill extended the present integration rules applicable to plans covering
self-employed individuals who are Owner-employees. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 1
§ 401(d)(6), extending rules to corporate plan benefitting "proprietary-employees,"i.e., 2%
stockholders. See SENATE REP.. supra note 90, at 126.
1 " 120 CLING. REC. 5.15737 (Aug. 22, 1974) (statement of Senator Williams).
1 " INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 410(6)(2)(A). There must be evidence that retire-
ment benefits were a subject of good faith bargaining between the union and the em-
ployer.
" 6
 Hearings on Tax Proposals Affecting Private Pension Plans Before the House Comm.
on Ways & Means, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 230 (1972). (statement of Mac Asbill, Jr. on
behalf of the American Bar Ass'n); SENATE REP., supra note 90, at 42.
120 Henle, Retell, Trends in Retirement Benefits Related to Earnings, MONTHLY LABOR
REV. 12, 18 (June, 1972).
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can to minimize participation by the lower paid in qualified plans.
The existence of contributory plans may be an indication that
this practice exists. In light of the more favorable tax treatment of
employer contributions, it is seemingly illogical for employers to insist
on mandatory contributions rather than just offering lower salaries
and paying the full cost of the pension. Excluding irrational behavior
and assuming employees look at total compensation and not just nom-
inal salary, the only reason for contributory plans would therefore be
the desire to avoid contributions on behalf of those employees who
place such a low value on pensions that they would be unwilling to ac-
cept an equivalent drop in salary. Contributory plans allow such peo-
ple to self-select out of the plan.
Given the incentive for employer efforts to exclude low income
employees, it seemed necessary to revise the tax laws to require great-
er participation and benefits for the lower paid than was previously
necessary as a condition of qualification. In light of this goal, the
amendments to the Internal Revenue Code concerning affiliated
groups and part-time and seasonal employees were clearly justified.
An employee working 1,000 hours would ordinarily be at his principal
job. Encouraging pensions for such employees is certainly within the
purposes of the tax law.' 2 ' Allowing richer pensions for a group of
employees merely because they were employed by a separate corpo-
rate entity was obviously unjustified.
On the other hand, ERISA's treatment of contributory plans is
clearly inadequate. The assumptions made above would suggest that
contributory plans cause a much greater loss of benefits for low in-
come people. It is also difficult to find a justification for contributory
plans. True, for a given dollar of employer contributions, the benefit
will be higher if the employee contributes. Many employees may de-
cline to do so, however, unless contributions are a condition of ben-
efits. If the benefit would otherwise be inadequate, those employees
who do contribute have been gently coerced into making sufficient
provision for retirement. Still, it is not clear why the employer could
not increase contributions and lower wages.
Admittedly, it would have been difficult without evidence in
support of this hypothesis for ERISA to outlaw plans which deny
coverage unless the employee voluntarily agrees to contribute. I would
suggest, however, that Congress initiate a study to determine to what
extent contributory plans lead to discrimination against low-paid in-
dividuals. It would be indeed unfortunate if one response to ERISA's
requirements for coverage for many short-service or part-time em-
ployees might be to try to exclude such people by making the plan
contributory.
In any event, it is certainly clear that once an employee contrib-
"'The desire to benefit a wider group of individuals could also explain the re-
strictions on maximum age as a condition for participation. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
* 410(a)(2).
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utes, he should not be offered the carrot of immediate recovery of
his accumulated contributions upon pre-retirement separation from
service, in order to secure his relinquishment of his right to the em-
ployer provided benefit. This practice, aside from being in direct con-
flict with the goal of promoting retirement savings, 'almost certainly
leads to employees acting against their own interests without adequate
information. Congress should eliminate this practice from the Civil
Service Retirement System' 22 and preclude forfeiture on withdrawal
of employee contributions from private plans, even if there is less
than 50 percent vesting.'"
It is also my opinion that integration with Social Security as now .
practiced is inconsistent with the special tax benefits for qualified
plans. As stated earlier, an incentive is offered to the higher paid
(who presumably would provide for their retirement in any event) in
order to encourage them to establish plans which also benefit the
lower paid. This is necessary because Social Security alone is inade-
quate. It makes no sense to allow integration if it leads to complete ex-
clusion of the low paid and limited benefits for the middle income
group.
On the other hand, if Social Security could not be taken into ac-
count, it would be impossible for an employer to provide a pension
adequate to replace pre-retirement earnings for the higher paid with-
out giving the lower paid a combined annuity, from Social Security
and the private plan, in excess of 100 percent of their income while
employed. Thus, integration does have a proper role. The present
rules, however, do not condition integration on a showing that the
combined benefit would otherwise be excessive. It is only necessary to
establish that the combined benefit does not discriminate against
lower paid employees. Such a showing can be made even if some in-
dividuals receive only Social Security.
The Internal Revenue Service rules on integration assume that
the total value of all Social Security benefits is approximately 162 per-
cent of the primary insurance amount (PIA). 124 Since the employer is
deemed to provide 50 percent of the benefit, 125 the employer would
be given credit under its plan for 81 percent of the primary Social
Security benefit. Thus, a plan formula providing a benefit of 40 per-
cent of compensation reduced. by 81 percent of the primary Social
122 5 U.S.C. 8342 (1970).
23 This rule was recommended by the Labor Department in 1968, see Hearing on
S. 3421 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 259 (1968) (Exhibit C to statement of Thomas R. Donahue, Ass't. Sec'y of
Labor). See also Panel Discussions on General Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways &
Means, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. at 1089, 1090 (1973) (statement of Dan M. McGill).
" 4 Treas. Reg. II 1.401.3(e)(2)(i)(1) ) (1971).
" 2 Id. 	 1.401-3(e)(2)(i)( c )..
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Security benefit would be deemed to treat all workers alike.'26 This
approach also allows a plan that excludes all earnings on which a So-
cial Security benefit is earned as long as the plan benefit on the
"excess"127 earnings is not richer than the level of Social Security. For
such an "excess" plan, the Social Security benefit provided by em-
ployer contributions is determined as a percentage of the wage base
on which Social Security benefits are payable. Following the reasoning
applied above, this should be 81 percent of the actual ratio of the PIA
to the average monthly earnings (AME) on which it is based. At pres-
ent, the Internal Revenue Service has set the integration level at 371/2
percent.'"
As described in Section VII, individuals retiring in 1976 can re-
ceive Social Security on, at most, only slightly in excess of $7,000 of
earnings. For those whose final earnings are at all significantly higher,
Social Security cannot provide full replacement: In these circum-
stances, an integrated plan should not be permitted to exclude most of
the earnings of a worker whose final earnings are $8,000 or $10,000
per year. Rather, the plan should be required to bring these retirees
up to an adequate level before it can integrate. In other words, the
plan benefit should not be allowed to take credit for social security
unless the total benefit (social security'" and private plan) on any
126 The Internal Revenue Service allows an 83 1/3% offset, Rev. Au]. 71-446,
1971-2 CUM. BULL. 187, 7.01. This was probably allowed in order to maintain the off-
set percentage permitted in the previous ruling on integration. Rev. Rid. 69-4, 1969-1
Cum, BULL 118, 121, 7.01.
27 The plan may provide a benefit only on wages in "excess" of earnings for
which a social benefit will be payable. If the plan covers all wages the benefit on "ex-
cess" wages will be at a higher level.
128 In 1971 when the last pronouncement on integration was issued, the average
ratio of PIA to AME was not the 46.3% needed to justify resetting the integration level
at 371/2%. See Treas. Reg. 5 1.401-3(e)(2)(i)(a) (1971). However, the Internal Revenue
Service anticipated future improvements in benefits, Treas. Reg. I.401-3(e)(2)(i)
(1971) in order to allow continued use of the 371/2% figure which had been in effect
since 1951. Mimeo. 6641, 1951-1 Cum, Butt. 41, 44. The 1951 calculation gave the em-
ployer credit for over 90% of the benefit. The Treasury Department kept the integra-
tion percentage constant, although the Social Security benefit was increasing, by credit-
ing the employer with a decreasing portion of the total benefit. See Treasury Dept Re-
lease F1403, 7 CCH 1968 STAND. FED. TAN REF16935C. In 1968 the Treasury deter-
mined that a 50-50 allocation was required and announced a new percentage of 30%.
See Rev. Rul. 69-4, 1969-1 Cum. But.0 118, 120, 5 5.021. However, the effective date of
the new rules for existing plans was such that 37.1/2% was still in use when the 1971
regulations were issued. See it at 124, 19. This anticipation of future improvements
has proved correct. The ration of PIA to AME for employees retiring in 1976 is at least
62%. See Section VII, Part B, infra. If, in accordance with present practice, Treas. Reg.
1.401-3(e)(2)(i)(a) (1971), this were averaged with the lowest possible ratio under cur-
rent law (44%) the result (53%) would still justify an integration percentage of about
43%. Forty-four percent is the ratio of the PIA ($522.80) to AME of $1,175, the Social
Security tax base during 1975. 40 Fed. Reg. 22291-96 (May 22, 1975), Of course, as
discussed in Section VII B infra, the Social Security tax base is now open-ended and is
in fact $15,300 during 1976, or $1275 per month.
• "9 In this connection, it is difficult to decide whether the entire social security
benefit or only the employer's share should be considered. While other private savings
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level of earnings is at least 80 percent (if not 100 percent) of pre-
retirement pay.' 3 °
I am uncertain of my reaction to the permission to disregard
employees in a collective bargaining unit in determining whether a
plan discriminates. I would like to know more than I do about the ef-
fect this rule will have on the collective bargaining process. In any
event, this change removes the only justification for a plan limited to
salaried employees; that is, one which excludes hourly workers. Such
a plan may be in technical compliance with the cross-section test for
qualificaton under the Code. However, while the cross-section test is
fair, it should not be utilized to justify an unreasonable class. For ex-
ample, I doubt if a classification of employees whose names begin
with the letters A-M would be acceptable even if it passed the cross-
section test. The salary-hourly classification does not have any greater
justification. Accordingly, salaried plans should now be prohibited.' 3 '
(b) Title I
I have indicated approval of the tax amendments concerning af-
filiated groups, part-time and seasonal employees and limitation on
forfeiture because of withdrawal of employee contributions. The sup-
port for the corresponding provisions of Title I of ERISA may be less
clear.
Since Title I does not prohibit distinctions based upon job clàss-
ifications or earnings levels, considering all employees of an affiliated
group as employed by one employer"/ cannot require entry into the
plan or accrual of benefits for employees of an affiliated company. It
just means that years of service with an affiliate must he counted to-
ward eligibility and vesting. Preventing the loss of accrued benefits for
one who switches jobs within an affiliated group of corporations
seems consistent with Title I.
An employee has mistakenly relied on retirement protection if
he will in fact lose this protection through withdrawal of his own con-
tributions. Although the employee is in a sense responsible for this
failure of the pension system, it seems consistent with Title I to pro-
tect him against his folly.'"
On the other hand, investigation might reveal that part-time and
seasonal employees understood•quite clearly that they were not enti-
tled to retirement benefits. Therefore, it is not clear that required .
would obviously be ignored, the compulsory nature of the social security program may
raise different considerations.
'See Public Hearings on the Subject of General Tax Reform Before the House Comm.
on Ways & Means, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 12, at 5017, 5026 (1973) (statement of Victor
Zonana).
13 ' Compare PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE PENSION PROGRAMS, A REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT ON PRIVATE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT PROGRAMS 60-61 (1965).
'" ERISA § 210(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1060(c) (Supp. IV, 1975).
133 See ERISA § 206(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(c) (Supp. IV, 1975).
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coverage of such employees' 34 or the restriction on a maximum eligi-
bility age' 35 can be explained. Congress seems simply to have decided
to prescribe conditions for pension plans. While this is certainly ap-
propriate when tax-relief is afforded, it is doubtful that, given a
purely voluntary system, such provisions are an appropriate part of
Title I. Perhaps, however, the part-time requirement is necessary to
protect full time employees who at times work on a less than full time
basis. The prohibition of a maximum age condition may derive from
the policy of preventing age discrimination in employment.'"
C. Period of Distribution of Benefits
1. Prior Law
The goal of a retirement program, should be to provide income
during retirement of the employee and perhaps his or her spouse.
The pension should not be dissipated at an earlier stage, nor should
the plan be utilized to accumulate an estate to be passed onto the next
generation.
Thus, in 1962 when Congress extended the benefit of qualified
plans to the self-employed, it required that distribution to substantial
owners begin no earlier than age 59 1/2" 7 and no later than age 70
1/2 133 even if the individual does not retire. Furthermore, distribu-
tions to all participants in plans in which the self-employed participate
cannot extend beyond the period of life expectancy of the employee
and spouse.' 39
Restrictions on qualified corporate plans are much more limited.
Profit sharing plans can distribute benefits after a two-year accumu-
lation' 4" and while pension plans cannot ordinarily make pre-
retirement distributions to employees,"' distributions upon separation
from service 142 or lurnp-sum distributions, at retirement' 43 are not
' 34 ERISA § 20290(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(3) (Stapp. IV, 1975).
13 ERISA § 202(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(2) (Supp. IV, 1975).
"" See 29 U.S.C. § 623(1970).
1 " 1 INT. REV. CODE. OE 1954, § 401(d)(4). The statutory term is "owner-employees"
and it applies to sole-pnquietors and partners with a 10% interest. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 401(0(3).
1 "" INT. REV. CODE 0r 1954, § 401(a)(9)(A).
"" Id. § 40I(a)(9).
"" Rev. Rul. 71-295, 1971-2 Con. Burr. 184, Many would argue that this permis-
sion is not inappropriate because profit-sharing plans are not necessarily intended to
provide for retirement. Thus, some profit-sharing plans would not be subject to the
eligibility and vesting requirements of Title I. See ERISA §§ 3(a)(2), 201, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 100290(2), 1051 (Stipp. IV, 1975). I would agree but plans not intended to provide
retirement income would need to present other arguments for the special tax benent
than those so far advanced.
" 3 See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (1972).
"2 Guides for Qualification, supra note 97, pt. 2(o)(1), at 9.
'" Id. pt. 2(u), at 10. -l -he lump sum distribution cannot be the only option, how-
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prohibited. In fact, the latter are encouraged by favorable tax
treatment.'" It may also be possible to circumvent the restrictions on
distributions during employment by the use of loans.'"
Some employees, rather than obtaining their pension prior to re-
tirement, seek to avoid any distribution at all or to spread the dis-
tribution over as long a period as possible. The regulations indicate
that benefits payable to the beneficiary of an employee must be inci-
dental to the primary purpose of distributing accumulated benefits to
the employee.'" The Internal Revenue Service has construed this to
permit any settlement option, as long as the present value of the
payments to be made to the participant is more than 50 percent of
the present value of the total pension, or where the payment is made
over the life of the employee and his spouse, even though the ben-
eficiary who is to receive payment after the employee's death is not
the spouse.' 47 According to the Internal Revenue Service, this permits
a 30-year pay-out. Further, since distribution need not start unless
employment terminates, principal shareholders of close corporations
are reluctant to "retire." In part, at least, the exclusion of the value of
a qualified pension from the estate tax base'" motivates this behavior.
Even if the employee arranges to receive a life annuity, retire-
ment security is not assured for the employee's spouse if the em-
ployee dies first. Although many programs offered the employee a
choice of providing a survivor annuity, the employee did not always
take advantage of the opportunity.'"
2. Effect of ERISA
It seems that the rules Congress adopted in 1962 for distribu-
tions to substantial owners of unincorporated businesses are valid and
should be extended to all pension programs. ERISA unfortunately
did not do so to any appreciable extent. It did, however, make it more
likely that an employee will provide for his spouse.
(a) Pre-Retirement Distributions
ERISA prohibits assignment or alienation of pension rights'"
'" See text at notes 154-63 infra.
"s See Guides for Qualification, supra note 97, pt. 5(o), at 20.
'"See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(i), (ii) (1972).
' 41 Rev. Rul. 72-240, 241, 1972-1 CUM. Buil.. 108.
I " INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2039(c). The 1965 Report of the President's Comm.
recommended the elimination of this exemption. PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE PENSIONS
PROGRAM, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON PRIVATE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT PLANS 60.
See PRIVATE PENSION TAX REFORM, H.R. REP. No. 779, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 65
[hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]; Hearings on Examination of Private Welfare and Pen-
sion Plans Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Sen. Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1971).
ERISA § 206(d)(I), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (Supp IV, 1975); INT. REV. CODE OP
1954, 401(a)(13).
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but does not preclude loans from a plan secured by the participant's
nonforfeitable benefit's' The prohibition against forfeiture of a 50
percent vested benefit upon withdrawal of employee contributions'"
will probably result in the retention of retirement benefits that other-
wise would have been lost. However, ERISA does not generally pro-
hibit pre-retirement distributions. In fact they may be encouraged.
Ordinarily, future service following a break-in-service can affect the
nonforfeitable percentage of the benefit accrued prior to the break.
However, if the nonforfeitable portion of the benefit is distributed at
the time of termination from service, and either the amount distrib-
uted is less than $1,750 or the distribution is with the employee's
consent then, unless the employee repays the distribution, he will not
obtain any greater interest in his pre-break benefit.'53
(b) Lump-Sum Distributions
For over 30 years the Internal Revenue Code has provided
favorable tax treatment for so-called lump-sum distributions.'54 Prior
to the Tax Reform Act of 1969, if the total value of the employee's
account was distributed in one taxable year on account of death or
separation from service, the amount received by the employee was
treated as a long-term capital gain."5 The 1969 Act denied capital
gain treatment to the extent the distribution consisted of post-1969
employer contributions but the portion derived from earnings of the
trust was to remain entitled to the favorable designation.'" The allo-
cation between the portion entitled to be treated as a long-term capital
gain and the remainder of the distribution and the application of the
special 7 year averaging procedure for the latter portion proved to be
enormously complex.'" Thus, Congress decided to try again.
In general after the transition period, a lump-sum distribution
will be taxed as if it were distributed over a 10 year period and were
the only income a single taxpayer earned during that time.'" While I
suspect the ERISA solution is an ithprovetnent over prior law,'5" it
151 ER1SA §206(d)(2), 29 U.S.C: § 1056(d)(2) (Supp. IV, 1975); INT. RFIV. CODE
OF 1954, §1401(a)(13), 4975(d)(1).
'52 ERISA § 206(c) 29 U.S.C. § 1056(c) (Supp. IV, 1975); INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 401(0(19).
"See ER1SA § 204(d), 29 U.S.C. §1054(d)_(Supp. IV, 1975); INT, REV, CODE OF
1954, §411(a)(7)(B), (C). HOUSE REPORT, supra note 149, at 58-59.
"'See Panel Discussions, supra note 123, at 1069. 1073 (statement of Herman C.
Hiegel).
1" 1141'. REV. CODE OF 1954, as it existed prior to the Tax Retbrm Act of 1969.
§402(a)(2).
""Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, §515(a)(1), adding § 402(0(5)
to the Internal Revenue Code, This section has been repealed by ER1SA.
152 HOUSE REPORT, Sllpra note 149, at 37; Panel Discussions, supra note 123, at
1085-86. (statement of Herman C. liege!).
'5" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §402(e)(1)(C).
”"But see Written Statements on H.R. 10470 Before the House Comm. on Ways &
Means, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 989, 991 (1973) (statement of Prof. Stuart Filler).
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seems clear to me that the special treatment for lump sum distribu-
tions is a classic case of putting the cart before the horse. Ostensibly
necessary to mitigate the harsh effect of a large distribution in one
year, the special rule will often result in lump-sum distributions bear-
ing less tax than benefits received in installments. In fact, many lump-
sum distributions are the result of a desire to take advantage of the
special tax treatment.
It is senseless to encourage retired persons to take the entire ac-
cumulation in one year instead of spreading the receipt of the pen-
sion over their lifetime.'" There is indeed no reason for any distribu-
tion to be taxed all in one year. If an annuity contract is distributed,
taxation is deferred until the annuity becomes payable. 16 ' ERISA
permits a lump-sum distribution to be excluded from gross income if
the amount of the distribution is transferred to an Individual Retire-
ment Account.' 62 Tax would be paid as the employee makes with-
drawals from such account. 163 No special averaging procedure is
necessary or desirable.
(c) Provision for Surviving Spouse
A retirement plan, as the name implies, is intended to provide
for an employee after his working career ceases. If the employee dies
prematurely, protection should be afforded from life insurance and
not necessarily as part of a pension program. Thus, the employer may
have a group insurance program and not pay death benefits through
the retirement plan.
Confusion arises over the source of income for the support of
the employee's dependents upon his death after retirement or close
thereto. Group life insurance is ordinarily reduced for retired em-
ployees and the pension plan seems the more logical source. There-
fore, employees who have dependents should elect to take their pen-
sion as a joint and survivor annuity, or in another form which would
not end with their death. In some plans, a survivor annuity is the
most commonly selected option,'" but apparently in other cases, an
employee's spouse was generally left unprotected after the employee's
death.
ERISA seeks to remedy this problem by providing that if a plan
pays benefits in the form of an annuity and an employee is married
on the starting date of the annuity, then unless the employee elects
otherwise the annuity must be paid for the life of the employee and
'°° Id. PUBLIC POLICY ec PRIVATE PENSION PROGRAMS, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
ON PRIVATE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT PLANS 65 (1965).
161 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 72, 402(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-I(a)(2) (1966).
182 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 402(a)(5).
lea Id. § 408(d).
' 64 TEACHERS INS. & ANNUITY ASSN, COLLEGE RETIREMENT EQUITIES FUND, 1972-73
SURVEY OF RETIRED TIAA-CREF ANNUITANTS 83 (1974).
768
AN EVALUATION OF ERISA
his or her spouse.'" Thus, in the absence of any affirmative action,
the spouse will be protected. ERISA also requires the employer to
allow the employee to elect a death benefit in the case of death before
retirement, but after the early retirement date.'" Although this provi-
sion makes it unnecessary to retire in order to protect one's spouse,
the option need not be operative in the absence of the employee's
election.
III. SECURITY OF BENEFITS
A vested benefit is an empty promise if funds are not available
to meet the plan's obligation. Thus, the tax advantages of qualified
plans were available only if the plan were funded. 1 °' Further, assets
were to be used exclusively for The benefit of the participantsl" and
certain transactions between plans and related parties were scrutinized
to make certain they met the requirements of arm's-length dealing.'"
These provisions serve to protect the employee against the financial
failure of the employer.
ERISA increases this protection. The funding requirements for
qualified plans, more stringent, specific and enforceable"° than be-
fore, were made applicable to non-qualified plans.'" Assets allocated
to a pension plan, whether or not required by the funding standard
must be held in trust.'" If the employee's benefit is to vary with the
performance of a particular fund managed by the employer, then
such fund will presumably be deemed an asset of the plan for this
purpose.
The responsibilities of a fiduciary were specified'" and the fed-
eral courts were opened to litigation to make certain that a right
would not be lost for want of a forum. 174 To avoid the necessity of
determining whether dealing was at arm's-length, most transactions
between employee benefit plans and related parties were
„.... 	 . . 	 . 	 ,
162 ERISA § 205, 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (Supp. IV, 1975); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§401(a)(11).
ten ERISA § 205(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c) (Supp. IV, 1975) INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 401(a)(11)(C).
127 Guides fin-
 Qualification of Pension, Profit Sharing, and Stock Bonus Plans, IRS,
PUB. No. 788, pt. 2(b), at 4 (Feb. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Guides for Qualification].
ms 1 me. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 401(a)(2).
1 B 0 Id. § 503, as it existed prior to ERISA. •
1 " See Part B2 of this section, infra.
' 7 ' ERISA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 1081 (Supp. IV, 1975).
172 ERISA § 403(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1 103(a) (Supp. IV, 1975).
173
 ERISA §§ 402, 403, 404, 405, 409, 410, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1102, 1103, 1104, 1105,
1109, 1110 (Supp. IV, 1975). The last section prohibits exculpatory provisions.
' 74
 ERISA §§ 502(e),(f), 29 U.S.C. §§ I132(e),(0 (Supp. IV, 1975). To eliminate
the dilemma over whoin to sue, the Act allows the plan to be sued as an entity. ERISA
§ 502 (d), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d) (Supp. IV, 1975). For a discussion of the difficulties of
enforcing one's rights under prior law, see COMM. ON LABOR Se PUBLIC WELFARE, S. REP.
No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 227 (1973).
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prohibited. 15 This included restrictions on investments in employer
securities.' 78
In a plan of a defined contribution type where the employee's
benefit depends upon the balance in his account, the above provi-
sions, if effective, would be fully protective by assuring that the
proper amount is set aside and not dissipated by defalcation or unwise
investments.
In a defined benefit plan the problem is more difficult. Assets
sufficient to provide the promised benefit may never have been con-
tributed to the trust. Nevertheless, under ERISA, if a defined benefit
plan terminates without adequate assets, payment of a basic level of
benefits is guaranteed.
Part A of this section discusses the operation of defined benefit
and defined contribution plans. Part B describes the causes of the
shortage of assets on termination of defined benefit plans and the
changes adopted to combat the problem. There has been no ex-
pressed concern about termination of defined contribution plans.
Apparently, since specific benefits are not promised, there is nothing
to guarantee.
Part C will try to determine if defined contribution plans really
cannot have inadequate assets and to consider whether the divergence
between defined contribution and defined benefit plans is justified.
Finally, Part D of this section discusses whether the employee should
be subject to the risk of fluctuation in the value of stock in the em-
ployer.
A. Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans
Retirement programs can be classified into two principal
categories: Defined Contributionm and Defined Benefit.'"
Defined Contribution Plans are of two types—money-purchase
and profit-sharing. Money-purchase plans call for specific contribu-
tions, usually a percentage of pay. Under profit-sharing plans, con-
tributions are made out of corporate earnings, either at the discretion
of the Board of Directors or under a formula stated in the plan.
Stock-bonus plans are similar to profit-sharing except that contribu-
tions are not necessarily dependent upon profits and distributions
must be made with employer stock. These contributions are credited
to individual accounts for employees, the value of which fluctuates in
"' ERISA §§ 406, 408, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106, 1108 (Supp. IV, 1975); INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 4975.
'" ERISA § 407, 29 U.S.C. § 1107 (Supp. IV, 1975). See generally Herbert,
Investment Regulation and Conflicts of Interest in Employer-Managed Pension Plans, 17 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. REV. 127 (1976).
177 ERISA § 3(34), 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (34) (Supp. IV, 1975); INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 414(i). Title I also uses the term "individual account plan."
ERISA § 3(35), 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (35) (Supp. IV, 1975); INT. REV. CODE or
1954, § 414(j).
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accordance with the plan's investment income. Therefore, while the
contributions to a money-purchase plan and, perhaps, profit-sharing
plans as well, may be set with a specific benefit in mind, benefits are
not guaranteed. The pension will vary depending upon the invest-
ment performance.
A defined benefit plan, as the name implies, provides for a
specific benefit, frequently a percentage of compensation (for the
years just prior to retirement) multiplied by years of service. Some
plans, however, will average the employee's earnings over a longer
period, occasionally his entire period of employment. Other plans,
particularly those for a collective bargaining unit, provide a specified
dollar benefit per year of service. The employer contribution to this
type of plan is the amount necessary to pay the promised benefits,
and will rise or fall with the investment performance.
B. Termination of Defined Benefit Plans
1. Shortage of Assets on Termination
An asset deficiency at termination arises because most defined
benefit pension plans provide credit for service performed with the
company prior to the establishment of the plan, or prior to the adop-
tion of an amendment increasing benefits. Thus, at the time the plan
is established, it will have liabilities (an unfunded initial liability) and
no assets. In practice, most companies will fund this unfunded initial
liability over 30 or 40 years, but since plans are continually amended,
and this same 30 or 40 year period is used to fund the past service
cost attributable to the amendment, the plan will amost never be fully
funded. Further, prior to ERISA, Internal Revenue Service regula-
tions did not require that the unfunded initial liability ever be funded:
the minimum funding required was uncertain but there was no diffi-
culty as long as the amount of unfunded liabilities was not allowed to
grow any larger.'" Some plans took advantage of this option.
If a plan continues in operation, this funding pattern is not
likely to be serious. Contributions will exceed benefits paid out, creat-
ing an adequate reserve."" A crisis arises only if the plan terminates.
At that point, it is usually true that plan assets will be substantially less
than accrued benefits. If a significant portion of accrued benefits are
vested, then plan assets may fall short of vested benefits as well.
Furthermore, the employer's promise to pay even vested benefits
was, with rare exceptions, limited to the assets in the pension trust.
170
 See fleas. Reg. 11 1.0101-6(0(2) (1963).
"° Panel Discussions on General Tax Reform before the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., at 1069, 1077 (1973) (statement of Herman C. Siegel); See also id. at 1091
(Reprint of Study of Subcomm. on Labor, Sen. Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare).
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Sometimes, the employer committed itself to a specified schedule of
funding, but almost never did it promise to make good any deficiency
in fund assets, even if the company were solvent.
There are three possible ways to allocate the burden of a short-
age of funds on termination:
(i) it can be placed on the beneficiaries of the terminated
plan:
(ii) it can be placed on the owners or stockholders of the
employer—the employer could be required to make up the
shortage out of its general assets; or
(Hi) it can be placed on business and employees generally
through the installation of plan termination insurance.
Prior to ERISA, the burden was placed on the employee.'81 On
its face this seems inexcusable. It is difficult for an employee to com-
prehend that he may not receive a vested pension even if the em-
ployer is solvent. It is obviously unusual for a promise to pay specified
amounts to depend upon the total of fairly discretionary transfers
from one pocket to another. Moreover, it could be worse if employees
as a group understood the risk, and planned for retirement without
regard to the possibility of a pension. Since most employees will re-
ceive the expected pension, this double saving is wasteful and ineffi-
cient.
ERISA places part of the burden on the employer through more
rapid funding and a requirement that in certain circumstances it
guarantee vested benefits up to a specific level. All employers with
qualified plans must contribute to a guaranty fund'82 which will back
up the terminating employer when it is unable—or, because of poor
economic health, not required—to meet this obligation. The employee
will bear the loss to the extent his vested benefits exceed the guaran-
teed level. The employee must also absorb the loss of non-vested
benefits.'"
2. Funding
One alternative method of guaranteeing sufficient assets on ter-
" See SEN. COMM. ON FINANCE, PRIVATE: PENSION PLAN REFORM, S. REP. No. 383,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 78-79 (1973):
ER1SA *4006, 29 U.S.C. 1306 (Supp. IV, 1975). A plan which in practice
meets the requirements for qualification is subject to plan termination insurance even if
it has not obtained a determination from the Internal Revenue Service. ERISA
§ 4021(a), 29 U.S.C. 1321(a) (Stipp. IV, 1975).
This is probably a mistake given the long vesting periods sanctioned by
ERISA, particularly in circumstances where the employer remains in business and the
employee eventually attains the service required for vesting. See Hearings on H.R. 1045,
General Subcomm. on Labor, House Comm. on flue. & Labor, 91st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess.
102, 107 (1969 - 70) (statement by Andrew J. Biemiller on behalf of AFL -CIO).
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mination would be to require immediate funding of all past service
liabilities. Aside from being a serious deterrent to the establishment of
plans or at least to the crediting of benefits for past service, most such
funding would be unnecessary. As stated above, a crisis ordinarily
arises only for those plans which terminate. It is not clear that it is ad-
visable to require huge reserves to be built up under the control of
trustees of private pension plans merely because a handful of such
plans terminate.'" Additional funding may be desirable only if neces-
sary to protect the integrity of the guaranty fund.'"'
ERISA adopts a middle course which probably will not require
much, if any, additional funding from the majority of employers. The
initial past service cost, and any past service cost created by an
amendment, must be funded over 30 years.'" Failure to meet this
standard is punished by an annual 5 percent tax on the funding
deficiency.'" Eventual compliance is assured by a threat of an excise
tax equal to the amount of any shortage which remains un-
corrected.'" Thus, generally speaking, if a plan were not improved
by amendment and actuarial estimates proved true, the plan would be
fully funded 30 years after its creation.
3. Employer Guaranty—Plan Termination Insurance
Since full funding is delayed for 30 years, the employee would
bear the risk of termination, unless the employer were liable or some
sort of guaranty fund was established. The Nixon Administration, al-
though recognizing that "even one worker whose retirement security
is destroyed by the termination of a plan is one too many,"' ""
nevertheless joined industry in opposing plan termination insurance
and employer liability. It may be asserted that it is unfair to force the
great majority of employers, who are able to fulfill their pension
promise, to make contributions to an insurance fund to support those
few employers who fail to meet their commitments.'" Further, the
opponents of insurance generally claimed that plan termination is not
I" 1 See irl. at 701 (statement of Congressman Dent). But see generally, OLD AGE
INCOME ASSURANCE PART V: FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF PENSION PLANS. SUBCOMM. ON FISCAL
POLICY. JOINT• ECONOMIC COMM., 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1967) (Paper by Roger F.
Murray, Economic Aspects of Pensions: A Summary Report).
185 See Panel Discussants, supra note 180, at 1126, 1137 (statement of Daniel
Halperin).
''" ERISA § 302(6)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1082(6)(2) (Supp. IV, 1975); INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 412(6)(2).
187 	§ 4971(a).
' 88 hi. § 4971(6).
"" Statement of Richard Nixon (Dec. 8, 1971) reprinted in Hearings an Tax Propos-
als Affecting Private Pension Plans Before the Home Comm. on Ways & Means, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. I, at 6, 10 (1972).
''''See Panel Discussions, supra note 180, at 1069, 1071 (statement of Herman C.
Biegel).
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an insurable risk,'" because in many cases it is within the control of
the employer who may stand to "profit" at the expense of the insur-
ance fund. The essential difficulty is to guarantee benefits which in.
the absence of such guarantee would have gone unpaid, without
undue expansion of the number of plan terminations. Terminations
could, of course, be planned to take advantage of insurance, but this
is not the, only difficulty. A more serious risk is the possibility an em-
ployer, who would have struggled to keep a plan in operation in
order to maintain a satisfied work staff, will terminate it once benefits
are guaranteed. An early version of termination insurance sought to
limit coverage to essentially involuntary terminations,'" for example,
closing of a facility or severe financial hardship, perhaps approaching
insolvency. ERISA is not so restricted.
The Act' 93
 establishes the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC) to insure pensions from qualified plans up to specified
amounts in the event a plan terminates, for any reason, without suffi-
cient funds to meet vested liabilities. The maximum insurable amount
is a life annuity beginning at age 65, equal to the lesser of 100 percent
of the employee's average compensation during the five consecutive
calendar years for which his earnings were the highest, or $9,000 an-
nually adjusted by the percentage increase in the Social Security Wage
Base since 1974. 1 " The limit is now approximately $10,430.' 95 New
plans or amendments increasing benefits will not be fully insured for
5 years.'" There may, however, be partial coverage of these new ben-
efits equal to the larger of 20 percent of the benefit or $240 for each
year since adoption, but only if the PBGC finds that the termination
was for a "reasonable business purpose" and not part of a plan to ob-
tain insurance.'" An individual who is more than 10 percent owner
of the business will obtain full insurance coverage only after 30 years
of participation in the plan, treating each benefit increase provided by
an amendment as if it were a new plan.' 98
If a plan termination occurs, the PBGC will assume responsibility
for payment of insured benefits if the plan's assets are inadequate.' 99
However, the employer is required to reimburse the PBGC for any
"' See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 189, at 578, 579 (Statement of Kenneth L.
Houck); id. at 833, 837 (statement of the National Ass'n of Manufacturers). But see
Panel Discussions, supra note 180, at 1089, 1101-06 (statement of Dan M. McGill).
192
 See Hearing on S. 3421, Subcomm. on Labor, Sen. Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 216, 235, 266 (statement of Thomas R. Donahue, Ass't Sec'y of
Labor).
193 ERISA §§ 4001-68, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-68 (Supp. IV, 1975).
'°' ERISA § 4022(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(3) (Supp. IV, 1975).
195 The Social Security Wage Base is now $15,300. In 1974 it was $13,200. This
requires an increase in the insured ceiling of approximately 15.9% or $1,430 on $9,000.
'" ERISA §4022(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. §1322(b)(1) (Supp. IV, 1975).
ERISA § 4022(6)(8), 29 U.S.C. § 1322(6)(8) (Supp. IV, 1975).
' 9° ERISA § 4022(6)(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1322(6)(6) (Supp. IV, 1975).
19° ERISA § 4061, 29 U.S.C. § 1361 (Supp. IV, 1975).
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outlay up to 30 percent of the employer's net worth. 20° The PBGC is
required to make insurance coverage for this potential liability avail-
able to employers 20 ' but it is authorized to prescribe conditions under
which payment will not be made under such insurance. 2 °2
While no doubt it would have been better if the debate had been
over "how to do it" instead of "whether it can or should be done," the
foregoing scheme does reflect years of study and effort to design a
guaranty program that is protective without being subject to excessive
abuse. 203 Congress chose to provide insurance regardless of the
reason for termination, thus taking the risk of "voluntary termination"
off the employee and placing it on the guaranty fund. It hoped to
protect the integrity of the fund by placing primary emphasis on em-
ployer liability. 204 If the employer must pay anyway, there is little to
be gained by termination.
However, presumably to minimize the deterrent effect of em-
ployer liability on establishment of plans and the credit rating of
employers 2 05 the employer is only liable to the extent of 30 percent
of its net worth and is to be offered insurance against this potential
liability. Thus, if the insured unfunded liabilities substantially exceed
30 percent of net worth or the employer is insured against liability,
the incentive to terminate remains. Protection against this occurrence
is sought in the relatively low level of benefits protected (adequate for
rank-and-file employees, but not large enough to provide a windfall
to the higher paid decision-making officials), the 60-month phase-in
of new benefits, and the stringent limits on benefits for substantial
owners. It also appears that Congress did not intend to provide insur-
ance coverage for employer liability, as long as the business continues,
whether or not ownership has changed. 20° Only experience will tell
whether ERISA has sufficiently protected the insurance fund against
abuse.
C. Insurance and Defined Contribution Plans
It is relatively certain, however, that the funding standard, the
premium for plan termination insurance and the potential employer
liability will cause some shift toward defined contribution plans.
Therefore, it is necessary to consider whether termination insurance
should have applied to at least some defined contribution plans.
Initially, it is necessary to decide whether defined contribution
20 ° ERISA § 4062(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (Supp. IV, 1975).
201 ERISA § 4023(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (Stipp. IV, 1975).
202 ERISA § 4023(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1323(d) (Supp. IV, 1975).
2 ° 3 See Retirement Income Security for Employees Act of 1973, S. 4, S. REP. No.
127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 204, 224 (1973).
2 ° 4 Id. at 224, SENATE REPORT. Stapra note 181, at 87; Pane/ Discussions, supra note
180, at 1089, 1093 (statement of Dan M. McGill).
2 ° 5 See SENATE REPORT, Mira note 181, at 87.
2 °5 See id. at 89. ERISA § 4023(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1323(d) (Supp. IV, 1975).
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plans in fact do not promise a specific benefit. Money-purchase plans
have a fixed contribution which under ERISA must be made
annually.207 While profit-sharing plans do not have a definite con-
tribution, in many circumstances the employer fully intends to
contribute the maximum permissible amount. If the contribution is
known, the expected pension can be estimated by making an assump-
tion as to the period of service, the employee's salary and the earnings
on the fund. The benefit is also subject to the employer's continued
willingness and ability to make contributions.
While there is obviously a considerable amount of uncertainty,
the departure from defined benefit plans turns out to be less than it
seems. The "defined" benefit is also dependent upon the employee's
future earnings and period of service, and, even after ERISA, on the
employer's continuation of the plan. An employer can, in the absence
of a collective bargaining agreement to the contrary, still terminate a
defined benefit plan without any requirement that benefits continue
to be accrued for service in the future, even for employees fully vest-
ed and close to retirement. If such a plan did not provide past service
benefits, it would be fully funded on termination only if the in-
vestment performance and other actuarial assumptions, such as mor-
tality and turnover, turned out as predicted. In a sense, then, the
guaranty merely covers past service benefits and actuarial errors
which have not been corrected at time of termination. Since each con-
tribution under a defined contribution plan is ordinarily based upon
current years earnings, defined contributions plans would be said not
to provide past service benefits. Moreover, since contributions are
credited to individual accounts, the only actuarial assumption which
seems relevant to defined contribution plans is expected earnings.
Therefore, unless there is to be a guarantee of investment perfor-
mance, there is nothing to insure.
It may be, however, that this is an oversimplification. An em-
ployee can surely perceive a defined contribution plan as providing
for past service. He would do so by taking his projected benefit and
dividing it by all his years of service. Moreover, a defined contribution
plan which is a Target Benefit Plan can do this explicitly. Such a plan
computes the employee's benefit in the same manner as a defined
benefit plan, for example, 1 percent per year of service including all
years of past service.2" The defined contribution is the level amount
required to accumulate enough funds to pay this benefit, under a
given interest rate. The benefit, however, is not guaranteed and it will
be more or less than the "target" depending upon actual investment
performance.
Assume an employee is age 45 with 10 years of past service at
the time a Target Benefit Plan is adopted. If the target benefit is 1
207 H.R. REP. NO. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 284 (1974). See ERISA § 301(a)(8), 29
U.S.C. § 1081(a)(8) (Supp. IV, 1975); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §412(h)(1).
2" See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 11.4 I0(a)-4(a).
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percent per year of service, the employee can expect a 30 percent
benefit at age 65, assuming the plan's investment performance is as
predicted. This employee may assume a 10 percent benefit has al-
ready been earned, but obviously if level contributions are to be made
for 20 years, there will be sufficient assets only at age 65. After 1
year, for example, the employee's account balance will fall far short of
what is required to provide an 11 percent benefit. It seems clear that
many employees will be misled concerning the benefit they can ex-
pect. This suggests that such plans should be subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the PBGC.
On the other hand, the message an employer gives when adopt-
ing a Target Benefit Plan could be stated in one of the following
ways:
(i) "I am willing to provide you with a pension based upon
all your service, past or future. However, I don't know how long I can
keep the plan going, so I will only provide you with a percentage of
your past service benefit for each year that the plan continues into the
future," or
(ii) "Your total pension will be based upon all your years of
service, past or future. However, once this amount is determined, it
will be restated as a larger benefit for each future year."
In the latter case, for example, the 30 percent benefit in the forego-
ing example could be restated as a benefit of 1 1/2 percent for each of
the 20 years of future service.
If this is a permissible message to employees under a defined
contribution plan, is it reasonable to allow a defined benefit plan to
operate in the same manner? In other words, can such a plan act as if
there are no past service benefits? All benefits however computed
would be "earned" pro rata for the future. ERISA does permit this
for defined benefit plans, but only for plans funded by individual in-
surance contracts or their equivalent. 2"
If the current operation of target benefit plans and individual
insurance contract plans is defensible, then it may be reasonable to
provide similar protection for defined benefit plans. For example, if
at the time it establishes or liberalizes a plan, the employer grants ben-
efits for prior service, the employer's responsibility to pay for such
benefits out of general corporate funds could be phased in slowly.
ERISA does phase in this liability over a 5 year period 2 10 but this may
2 ° 9
 ERISA § 301(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1081(b) (Stipp. IV, 1975); INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 412(i). The accrued benefit tinder these plans would be the cash surrender
value of the insurance contract, assuming all premiums are paid when due. ERISA
§ 204(b)(1)(F), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(I)(F) (Stipp. IV, 1975); INT. REV. CODE or 1954,
§ 411(b)(1)(F). See alio ERISA § 301(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1081(a)(2) (Supp. IV, 1975); INT.
REV. CODE or 1954, § 4 I2(h)(2). If such premiums are paid, there would be no shortage
to guarantee even though the cash surrender value would be inadequate to provide the
per year benefit described in the plan formula.
200
 See text at note 197 supra.
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be inadequate in light of the treatment of target benefit plans.
On balance, it seems logical to insist on a guarantee of the ben-
efit, as long as past service is taken into account to increase the fu-
ture benefit and thereby the required contribution. This approach is
more likely to conform to the employee's understanding. If so, then
the treatment of target benefit plans and individual insurance contract
plans needs further explanation.
D. Employer Securities
If a defined contribution plan invests in employer securities, the
employee bears the risk of fluctuation in value. He thus stands to
share in the good or bad fortune of the company.
If employer securities held by a defined benefit plan decline in
value, the initial impact is to increase the employer's contributions to
the trust. The employee will suffer directly only if the plan terminates
and, if the plan is qualified, only to the extent his benefits are not
vested or are in excess of the guarantee limit. Indirectly, however, the
fund's investment performance probably influences the level of bene-
fits the plan will provide.
This section considers whether an investment in stock of the
employer is consistent with congressional insistence that retirement
plans be funded and prudently invested. It seems clear that it is not.
Stock ownership in the employer is even less protection to the em-
ployee than the creditor status of an unfunded plan, because the em-
ployee as stockholder is subordinated to all creditors. If the company
fails, the employee not only loses his job, but also, except for plan
termination insurance, his nest egg for retirement. Moreover, in many
cases the employee is not expected to retain permanent ownership of
the stock. The stock will be redeemed at retirement in order to pro-
vide cash to meet living expenses. In such situations, the employee is
dependent upon the employer's ability to redeem the stock at the time
of his retirement. This seems equivalent to the risk the employee as-
sumes under an unfunded deferred compensation arrangement in
which the amount he will receive depends upon the value of the em-
ployer stock at time of distribution. In fact, it is a greater risk. Under
a non-qualified plan, the employer gets a tax deduction at the time of
distribution which will help generate funds for the payment. Con-
tributions to a qualified plan, even in the form of employer's stock,
are deductible when made. This deduction provides a cash saving to
the employer at that time, but unless this amount is specifically set
aside for the purpose of redeeming the stock, the employer will need
to generate cash at the time of distribution without benefit of the tax
deduction.
For example, if the employer contributes $1,000 of its own stock
to a qualified plan, it would provide an immediate tax saving of $500:
Assuming no change in value, the employer would require $1,000 to
redeem the stock at the time of the employee's retirement. If it_de-
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sires to finance this obligation currently, the employer could set
$1,000 aside and invest it in a manner it would hope would mirror
the performance of the employer stock. The result would be a net
cash outlay of $500, the same cost as a cash contribution of $1000.
However, the corporation would almost certainly choose to meet
the redemption obligation out of future earnings and thus avoid the
immediate set aside. Since the redemption, when it occurs, will be a
non-deductible expenditure, the employer will need cash equal to the
full value of the stock, $1000 if there, is no change in value. In com-
parison, a distribution of an equal deductible amount under an un-
funded plan would require only $500.
Prior to ERISA, it was unclear to what extent a qualified plan
could be invested in employer securities. Stock bonus plans were re-
quired to make distributions in such securities.2" Moreover, the In-
ternal Revenue Code provided favorable tax treatment for distribu-
tions of employer securities from all types of qualified plans.212
Therefore, such investments were obviously not precluded. On the
other hand, as stated above, assets were to be used for the exclusive
benefit of participants and transactions between the plan and related
parties had to be at arm's-length.2" These provisions were peculiarly
applicable to investments in employer securities.2"
ERISA places an overall limit on acquistions of employer se-
curities by all funded pension plans in that immediately after the ac-
quisition, the total holdings of employer securities cannot exceed 10
percent of the fair market value of the assets of the plan.2" However,
this restriction does not apply to "an eligible individual account
plan,"216 which includes any profit sharing or stock bonus plan.217
Such a plan can invest all of its assets in employer securities and is
specifically exempt with respect to such holdings, from the general di-
versification requirement2" and even the prudent investment rule's°
to the extent it requires diversification.22" The requirement of pru-
dence, aside from diversification, applies to an undetermined extent.
Unless employee ownership of the business has strong public
policy objectives which override the interest in retirement security,221
'" Treas. Reg. §1.401-1(b)(1)(iii) (1972).
in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 402(a)(1). The applicable rules for lump sum dis-
tributions were previously contained in § 402(a)(2). Now it is also necessary to consider
§ 402(e)(4)(J).
"3 INT. REV. CODE Or 1954, § 40I(a)(2); id. § 503 as it existed prior to ERISA.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(5)(ii); Guides for Qualifkation, supra note 167, at
Pt. 2(k), at 7 (Feb. 1972).
2'3 ERISA §407(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § I 07(a)(2) (Supp. IV, 1975).
116 ERISA § 407(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(b)(1) (Supp. IV, 1975).
2'2 ER1SA § 407(d)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. § I107(d)(3)(A) (Supp. IV, 1975).
"" ERISA § 404(a)(I)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (Supp. IV, 1975).
212 ERISA §.404(a)(I)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (Supp. IV, 1975).
220 ERISA §404(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2) (Supp. IV, 1975).
22' So-called Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) have been championed as
a means of solving current economic difficulties. For example, §46(a)(1)(B) of the In-
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it is clear these exceptions are not warranted. At least the 10 percent
limit should be applied across the board. Moreover, distributions in
employer securities should be taxed to the same extent as other
property. 222 In any event, the special tax benefits of qualified plans
should not be available to the extent the plan's assets consist of em-
ployer stock.
IV. ESTABLISHMENT OF PLANS
Sections II and III of this Article strongly suggest that under
ERISA, despite its shortcomings, if the employer has a plan, the em-
ployee is more likely to be a participant and to actually obtain a be-
nefit. The next question to be addressed is the impact of the Act on
the number and types of plans that can be expected to exist.
Wherever ERISA eases restrictions, it will tend to encourage the
establishment of pension plans. For example, since partners and sole
proprietors can now contribute more for themselves, they are more
likely to establish plans for their employees. 223
 Plans for the non-
unionized portion of the work force may increase since it is now
easier to exclude employees in a collective bargaining unit. 224
For the most part, however, ERISA reduces employer freedom.
Since this makes it less likely that an employer will be able to achieve
its goal, it is obvious that ERISA will have an inhibiting effect on the
maintenance of plans. 225
 This is not necessarily inconsistent with the
intent of the legislation. Fewer plans are acceptable because the ones
that remain will cover more people, will provide benefits consistent
with public policy and will live up to their promise.
ternal Revenue Code of 1954 as added by § 301(a) of the Tax Reduction Act of 1975,
Pub. L. No. 94-12 provides an extra 1% investment credit if the employer transfers
stock of an equivalent value to an employee stock ownership plan meeting the condi-
tions of 30I(d) of the Act. See Tax Reduction Act of 1975, S. REP. Nu. 36, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. as reprinted in 1975-1 CUM, BULL 590, 617; Hearings, supra note 189, at 647 (tes-
timony of Louis 0. Kelso); Chadwick & Foster, Federal Regulation of Retirement Plans: The
Quest for Parity, 28 VAND. L. REV. 641, 686-87 (1975). Not everyone would agree with
ESOPs' supporters. See generally Hearings on Stock Ownership Plans, joint Economic Comm.,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec. 11, 12, 1975); Free Distributions of Stock to Einployees are
Spurred by New Tax-Law Provision, Wall St. J., April 29, 1975, at 44, col. I.
- 222 PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE PENSION PROGRAMS, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
ON PRIVATE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT PLANS 66 (1975).
2" The contribution limit for self-employed individuals was raised from $2,500
(or 10% or earned income if less) to $7,500 (but no more than 15% of earned income).
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 404(e)(1).
224 See text at notes 118-19 supra.
"4 There has been widespread publicity concerning "5000 plan terminations,"
. more than had been predicted, which critics have pointed to as showing the failure of
ERISA. A PBGC study apparently indicates that the economy, rather than ERISA, is
the chief culprit. See N.Y. Times, March 21, 1976, at 25, col. I; PRENTICE HALL. PENSION
& Fluor SHARING REP. No. 13, at 113.3 (March 5, 1976). The latter also reports a floor
statement by Sen. Davits referring to a study by the Institutional Investor which in-
dicates that almost 80% of the corporations surveyed had less than a 5% cost increase
from ERISA. 122 CONG. REC. S. 2498 (Feb. 26, 1976).
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Many of the missing plans would have been designed to provide
nearly all their benefits to a few high paid employees. Others would
have turned out to be an illusion, leaving employees without provision
for retirement. The loss of such plans is a positive not a negative re-
sult. On the other hand, employees who actually would have benefit-
ed if the terminated subpar plan was allowed to continue, and who
turn out to be unable to provide for themselves, will be worse off as a
result of ERISA.
In summary, the Act's approach to promoting retirement se-
curity involves a delicate balancing act22 " which cannot be evaluated
without empirical evidence. At this point, however, there are two
more specific effects of ERISA on the type of retirement programs
which are obvious enough to warrant further discussion.
ERISA makes it practically impossible to maintain non-qualified
plans for rank-and-file employees. Part A of this Section considers
whether this is a desirable result.
As noted above, the combined effect of funding, plan termina-
tion insurance and employer liability on defined benefit plans suggest
to some that defined contribution plans, if not the only feasible alter-
native, are at least a more likely choice than before. The implications
of this possible course of action are discussed in Part B.
A. ERISA and Non-Qualified Plans
Prior to ERISA, employers established non-qualified retirement
plans to meet two distinct objectives. Some plans were established for
key executives to provide extra benefits that employers did not want
to provide on a non-discriminatory basis to a large group of em-
ployees. In other circumstances, non-qualified plans were maintained
for rank-and-file employees because the employer wanted to avoid the
commitment that a qualified plan implied; that is, the employer
wanted total discretion as to who was to participate, the amount of
benefits and when funds were to be set aside. Some of these ar-
rangements operated, at least ostensibly, on a purely ad-hoc basis.
I. Non-Qualified Plans and Title I
Since the vesting and funding requirements of ERISA do not
apply to an unfunded plan "primarily for the purpose of providing
deferred compensation for a select group of management or highly
compensated employees" 227 the Act generally has little impact on the
continuation of non-qualified plans of the first type. 22" High paid
employees were considered to be able to fend for themselves and not
n° See Comment, The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of . 1974: Policies and
Problems, 26 Sva. L. REv. 539, 555 (1975).
227 ERISA §§ 201(a)(2), 301(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051(a)(2), 1081(a)(3) (Supp. IV,
1975).
22S See Section VI, Part C infra.
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in need of the protection afforded by ERISA.
The implication of ERISA for plans for the rank-and-file de-
pends upon whether it is a "plan, fund, or program which ... by its
express terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances ... pro-
vides retirement income to employees." 2" An argument could be
made that an arrangement which does not promise or guarantee ben-
efits to the employees does not constitute a "plan, fund, or program"
for purposes of ERISA. Such an argument might find support in sec-
tion 2 of ERISA, which in setting forth the congressional findings
leading to its enactment, emphasizes the problem of employees losing
"anticipated" benefits. Arguably, the protection afforded by ERISA is
inappropriate to programs designed to assure that employees do not
anticipate benefits.
On balance, however, this argument is unpersuasive. The Labor
Department has excluded "gratuitous payments" from ERISA cover-
age in the case of employees who both retired and started receiving
such payments out of their employer's general assets before Sep-
tember 2, 1974, providing the employer annually notifies such em-
ployees that all such payments are gratuitous."" One can infer from
this regulation that other "gratuitous payment" retirement programs
are, in the view of the Labor Department, subject to all pertinent
ERISA requirements. This is consistent with the view expressed ear-
lier that employers should not be allowed to promise a pension unless
there is a fairly good assurance the promise will be kept."'
In the first place, it is difficult to believe that word of retirement
payments does not spread to the continuing work force. Once em-
ployees know of such payments, they are likely to "anticipate" them.
Moreover, dangling a pension before an employee, at least during the
period he can expect to save for retirement, has an undesirable im-
pact regardless of the employee's appreciation of the uncertainty. The
loss if he expects a pension and does not get it is obvious. On the
other hand, if he saves as if a pension will not be forthcoming, and he
turns out to have been too pessimistic, there is undesirable and ineffi-
cient double saving. Thus, the application of the participation and
vesting requirements of Title I to non-qualified plans is reasonable.
As noted above, 232 non-qualified plans are subject to the funding
standards and any assets of such plan would be required to be held in
trust. There is no specific penalty for failure to meet the funding or
ERISA 1 3(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. 1 1002(2)(A) (Supp. IV, 1975).
n° 29 C.F.R. 1 2510.3-2(e), 40 Fed. Reg. 34532 (Aug. 15, 1975). Compare 40 Fed.
Reg. 24642 (June 9, 1975). ("These terms (plan or program) contemplate a systematic
and predetermined treatment of classes or types of similar situations. An informal pol-
icy ... fails to rise to the level of a plan or program.") The Labor Department has an-
nounced its intention to extend the cut-off date to employees retiring before the end of
1976. Dep't of Labor News Release 76-707, P-H Pension & Profit Sharing 1135160
(Apr. 26, 1976).
231 See text at note 18 supra.
232 See text at notes 171-72 .supra.
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trust requirement.232 The Labor Department can bring suit to compel
compliance,234 but may be unlikely to do so unless the employees
complain. The employees may be unwilling to insist upon funding, if
such funding means current taxation. Nevertheless, this seems a risky
scenario for the employer to rely on, particularly since company offi-
cials responsible for the failure to fund would seem to be in danger of
being personally liable for any benefits lost by such failure."'" Thus, it
seems likely that funding, or its equivalent, will be required in nearly
all cases. Again, this seems justified by the considerations set forth in
Section III of this paper. However, while it would have been logical to
extend the protection of plan termination insurance to such plans,
ERISA does not do so unless the plan qualifies in fact.232
2. Tax Treatment of Non-Qualified Plans
Title I of ERISA in general does not impose any restrictions on
the class of employees covered by non-qualified plans. Thus, a plan
limited to high paid individuals can continue to exist. This seems jus-
tified as long as pension coverage is not mandatory and the plan in
question does not seek any special tax relief. However, once the
coverage of a plan is sufficiently widespread so as to lose the benefit
of the exemption of plans "primarily for a select group of manage-
ment or highly paid employees," the lack of restrictions on coverage
will have little practical value. Since vesting and funding are manda-
tory, it will be virtually impossible to avoid funding vested benefits for
particular employees. The value of such benefits is taxed to the em-
ployee, even though distribution is delayed.237
If it is assumed that employees will not accept taxation without
distribution, an unqualified plan becomes impractical, and any plan
for the rank-and-file must be qualified. If qualification is also unac-
ceptable, termination may be the only recourse. It is questionable
whether it was necessary to create this dilemma.
There is no essential connection between ERISA's policy which
calls for funding and vesting and the tax policy which suggests that
vested funded benefits be taxed. The most significant advantage of a
qualified plan is the ability of the employer to deduct compensation
without it being taxed to the etnployee:232 Certainly, this cannot be al-
lowed under a non-qualified plan. However, it is not clear that it
would be unacceptable to delay taxation if the employer was also re-
333 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, *4971, is applicable only to qualified plans.
334 ERISA §502(a)(5)(B)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(5)(B)(ii) (Supp. IV, 1975).
234 See ER1SA 409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (Supp. IV, 1975).
233 Under ERISA § 4021(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1321 (Supp. IV, 1975), plan termination
insurance applies only to plans which have received a Favorable determination from the
Internal Revenue Service or which in practice have met the requirements of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code.
234 I NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, H83, 402(b).
333 See text at notes 14-15 supra.
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quired to defer its deduction. In other words, could vested benefits of
a non-qualified plan be treated like non-vested benefits for tax pur-
poses?
Under the Internal Revenue Code, if a trust is created under a
non-qualified plan, the trust is taxable on its income 23° and employer
contributions are not deductible until the employee's interest vests. 240
In computing its taxable income, the trust will be entitled to a deduc-
tion for distributions to the employee but only to the extent of earn-
ings on the distributee's share of the fund. 24 ' Distributions to the em-
ployee will be taxed under the rules relating to annuity contracts,'
not the provisions applicable to trust distributions.
The application of these rules may be explained by the follow-
ing example. On January 1, 1974 the employer contributes $10,000 to
a non-qualified trust on behalf of Smith. Smith must work until De-
cember 31, 1978, his normal retirement date, in order to obtain a
non-forfeitable benefit. The trust buys bonds, which produce annual
interest of 10 percent per year, and it is subject to tax at an effective
rate of 20 percent. On December 31, 1978 the trust distributes
$14,966 to Smith, determined as follows:
Example l —Deferral
Value of Account Interest Tax Year End Value
Jan.	 1, 1974 $10,000 $1,000 $200 $10,800
Jan.	 1, 1975 10,800 1,080 216 11,664
Jan. 1, 1976 11,664 1,166 233 12,597
Jan. 1, 1977 12,597 1,260 252 13,605
Jan. 1, 1978 13,605 1,361
243
14,966
If Smith's tax rate at retirement were 20 percent, the distribu-
tion of $14,966 will provide him with $11,973 after tax. Two
thousand dollars of Smith's tax payment of $2,993 is applicable to the
original $10,000 and the remaining $993 to the trust income. The
corporation's deduction of $10,000 244 in 1978 will, assuming an effec-
tive rate of 50 percent, reduce its taxes by $5,000.
In order to appreciate the potential benefit to Smith from this
deferral, we will determine the total accumulated if Smith received
$10,000 currently and invested the after-tax amount in the same
"9 See Rev. Rul. 74-299, 1974-I Cum. Butt. 154.
240 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 83(a), 402(6), 404(a)(5).
2" See Rev. Rul. 74-299, 1974-I Cum. Butt. 154.
242 Id.; INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 40204.
243 The trust is entitled to a deduction for the distribution, and thus it has no
taxable income. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 661(a).
"4 The corporation's deduction is not the amount received by Smith but its orig-
inal contribution to the trust when "an amount attributable to such contribution is in-
cludible as compensation." See Proposed Treas. Reg. 1.404(a)-12(b)(1) (1971).
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bonds. In this case, it will be assumed that Smith would have been
taxed at a 30 percent rate on both compensation and investment in-
come had he received current salary. Furthermore, it is assumed that
the corporation's position will be unchanged, that is, it will spend
$10,000 on January 1, 1974 and will retain the benefit of a $10,000
deduction on December 31, 1978. Therefore, we must consider the
corporation's disposition of the earnings provided by the $5000 tax
savings from the deduction in 1974. 245
Example 2—Current Salary
Smith Value of Investment Interest Tax Year End Value
Jan. 1, 1974 $7,000 $700 $210 $7,490
Jan. I, 1975 7,490 749 224 8,015
Jan. I, 1976 8,015 802 241 8,576
Jan. I, 1977 8,576 858 257 9,177
Jan. I, 1978 9,177 918 275 9,820
Corporation Value of Investment Interest Tax Year End Value
Jan. 1, 1974 $5,000 $500 $250 $5,250
Jan. 1, 1975 5,250 525 263 5,512
Jan. 1, 1976 5,512 551 275 5,788
Jan. I, 1977 5,788 579 290 6,077
Jan. I, 1978 6,077 608 304 6,381
At this point the corporation has $6,381, or $1,381 more than
the $5,000 it wishes to retain. The corporation can transfer the extra
$1,381 to Smith if it makes a deductible salary payment of $2,763. At
the 20 percent rate assumed applicable at retirement, Smith will ob-
tain an additional $2,210 after payment of tax of $553. Thus, the
total received by Smith is as follows:
Example 1: 	 $11,973 Example 2:
	 $9,820
2,210
$12,030
The comparison is highly sensitive to the assumptions of Smith's
current tax rate, the change in his rate at retirement, the period of
deferral, the rate of interest and the tax paid by the trust on its in-
vestment income. The source of the $57 detriment from deferral in
the foregoing example can be seen from the following table explain-
ing the growth of the original $10,000.
2" The possible advantage of investing in corporate stock is not considered. See
Section VI, Part C infra.
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Tax on $10,000
Deferred
Compensation
Current
Compensation
Difference
Compensation –2,000 –3,000 +1,000
Interest for 5
years +5,867 +6,790 – 923
Tax on Interest—
Trust –	 901 –1,7602" –	 134
Smith – 993
$1,973 $2,030 – $57
The employee's tax savings from the lower marginal tax rate
after retirement ($1,000) is offset by a decline in investment income.
This decline will occur if the corporation's tax rate is higher than the
employee's since in such cases, the delay of the corporate deduction
increases the overall tax burden and, thus, reduces the amount left to
invest. Further, the double tax on investment income at the trust and
employee level offsets the reduction in the employee's marginal rate.
If there was a greater reduction in Smith's marginal rate, then the
foregoing example would have resulted in an advantage from defer-
ral. However, such advantage may be said to result from lifetime av-
eraging. Such averaging for rank-and-file employees may only repre-
sent the extension of an advantage already widely used by the highly
paid."' Thus, the equitable distribution of the tax burden might not
require the present treatment of non-qualified plans. Nevertheless,
the inability to maintain such plans has positive results to the extent
there is a conversion into more equitable qualified arrangements. On
the other hand, if such plans are discontinued, there is a net loss in
retirement security since the assumption here is that the employer was
willing to conform to the vesting and funding requirements. This is
a matter for investigation but it seems reasonable to consider the pos-
sibility of an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code.
B. Defined Benefit Plans After ERISA
It has been argued that defined contribution plans should be
preferred to those of the defined benefit type. 248 Contributions under
money-purchase plans tend to be a level percentage of pay regardless
of age. If it is assumed a steady increase in salary will take place and
that an adequate retirement income must be measured against earnings
at the time of retirement, the contribution level will have to be higher
than it would be if earnings were expected to remain steady. Thus,
the vested benefit under a money-purchase plan will include some
246 Smith paid tax of $7,207 on his investment income plus an additional $553
when the corporation transferred its investment income to him.
247 See Section VI, Part C infra. •
248 TIAA-CREF, The Participant, July 1973, at 4-5.
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provision for anticipated increases in earnings. A defined benefit plan
on the contrary will determine the value of a vested benefit by refer-
ence to earnings at the time of separation from service. Under the lat-
ter, therefore, the amount of pension will be less if the employee
changes jobs than if he stays with one employer.'" A money-purchase
plan will produce the same benefit in both situations. On the other
hand, this analysis assumes the employer correctly perceives the rate
of salary growth and it ignores the difficulty of providing for past
service under a money-purchase plan started or improved when the
employee is in mid-career.
On balance, I believe d defined benefit plan is preferable. The
principal argument for Social Security and other forced savings for
retirement is the difficulty faced by an individual in attempting to
plan on his own. As noted above, people do not ordinarily face the
issue far enough in advance, and when they do, they find it hard to
determine how much to put aside. A defined contribution plan is not
a full solution. The amount available at retirement is a function of
earnings on the fund. Further, the adequacy of the accumulation to
enable maintenance of the pre-retirement living standard depends
upon the change in salary level over one's career. Very few individu-
als can estimate the adequacy of their benefit from a defined
contribution plan. A defined benefit plan, if it promises a specified
percentage of earnings at retirement (or of average earnings over the
last five years), provides much greater security. At least the employee
will know what the benefit will be, and can determine if he desires
additional saving.
There is an obvious dilemma here. Plan termination insurance
seems a necessary part of a defined benefit plan but it can do more
harm than good if it causes a significant shift to defined contribution
plans. This might not be a serious worry if employees come to under-
stand the advantages and have the economic power to force retention
of defined benefit plans and the security of plan termination
insurance.250 Moreover, defined contribution plans, even those of the
money-purchase type, are not complete substitutes for defined benefit
plans.25' Nevertheless, it seems worthwhile to consider the issue raised
2" See text at notes 38-39 supra.
"2 One staff member who participated in the development of ER1SA has in-
dicated his belief that while there may be a short-run movement toward Target Benefit
Plans, in the long run, employee resistance will prevent any significant change. Gordon,
The Implications of Federal Minimum Standards for Private 'Pension Plans, 27 NAT'L TAX J.
437, 440 (1974).
Target benefit plans are subject to the contribution limits imposed on defined
contribution plans, PRIVATE PENSION TAX REFORM, H.R. REP. No. 779, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 119 (1974), which will make it more difficult to utilize them to provide very large
benefits for older employees with many years of past service at the time the plan is
adopted. Further, such plans ordinarily provide a death benefit equal to the amount of
the account balance. Death benefits from a defined benefit plan may be much more
limited.
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earlier concerning the justification for the complete discrepancy be-
tween the two types of plans for purposes of plan termination insur-
ance.
V. SAVINGS BY INDIVIDUALS—NOTICE AND TAX RELIEF
Part A of this Section discusses whether employees who will not
obtain the protection of a private pension plan will be warned early
enough so they will have time to provide an adequate retirement in-
come on their own. Part B considers the possibility of a tax incentive
for such saving.
A. Information to Employees
Unquestionably, many employers will not have retirement pro-
grams. Employees of such enterprises will know, as they have always
known, that they must provide for themselves. At the other extreme,
at least with a defined benefit plan, once a pension benefit, not in ex-
cess of the guaranteed limits and in effect for five years, has vested,
the employee can assume it will be paid. 252
 As discussed above, there
may be more uncertainty in a defined contribution plan. The em-
ployee always bears the risk of investment performance and under a
target benefit plan, there may be confusion as to the amount of the
benefit which has been funded.
Misunderstanding may be minimized by ERISA's requirements
for distribution of' information to employees. Participants are to re-
ceive a summary description of the plan in a manner designed to be
understood by the average participant. 253
 A summary of any material
modification is to be issued annually and a revised summary is to be
distributed every five or ten years, depending upon whether there are
amendments in the interim. 254
The summary is to set forth the plan provisions providing for
non-forfeitable pensions and the circumstances which may result in
denial or loss of benefits. 255
 In addition, each participant is entitled
upon request, made no more often than once each year, to a state-
ment which would indicate the benefits accrued and the value of his
non-forfeitable benefits, or the date when such benefits will become
non-forfeitable. 256
 It would have been better for these reports to have
been mandatory, but hopefully individuals will learn to make an an-
nual request. These statements also would be more useful if they indi-
cated the dollar amount that would be guaranteed in the event of a
plan termination.
"'See Section III, Pan B supra.
253 ERISA §§ 02(a)(1), 104(b)( 1)(A), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1022(a)(I), 1024(b)(I)(A), (Supp.
IV, 1975).
254 ERISA § 104(b), 29 U.S.C. § 102404 (Supp. IV, 1975).
255 ERISA § 102(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b) (Supp. IV, 1975).
256 ERISA § 105(a), (b), 29 U.S.C. § 1025(a), (b) (Supp. IV, 1975).
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If a worker has stayed with one employer, uncertainty as to ac-
crued but unvested pensions will be eliminated after no more than 15
years of service after age 22. This is the longest period permitted by
ERISA before 100 percent vesting is required. However, employees
who have changed jobs may remain unsure of a pension until quite
close to their retirement.
Nevertheless, despite the room for improvement, ERISA clearly
has improved the odds that an employee will know and understand
his chances for a pension. It also has attempted to make saving for re-
tirement less painful for those who must do so on their own.
B. Individual Retirement Accounts
The long-standing use of tax incentives to encourage retirement
savings for lower income workers undoubtedly suggested a turn in
that direction when Congress sought to encourage individual savings.
Thus, the Internal Revenue Code now allows a tax deduction for 15
percent of compensation, up to a maximum of $1,500 per year, for
contributions to an Individual Retirement Account (IRA). 257 This
does not seem a promising route to the desired goal, however, and it
is therefore doubly unfortunate that the idea was not implemented in
the manner most likely to reduce the risk of tax inequity.
IRAs are a threat to the policy of promoting qualified plans.
The tax advantage to the wealthy under a qualified plan is tolerated
as a means of encouraging provision for the lower paid, who cannot
be expected to save on their own. There is no similar reason to allow
an IRA for the wealthy. At least, Congress should have limited the
use of IRAs to relatively low income persons for whom government
aid in saving for retirement is justified.
It is particularly unfortunate that IRAs are available to individual
owners of a business or shareholder employees, who have the power
to initiate a company-wide plan.'" Because of the strict limits on con-
tributions to an IRA there is a continued incentive to establish a
richer company-wide plan. Still some, who would have adopted a plan
which would include their employees, will now turn to an IRA. The
latter choice may be reinforced by the possibility of providing past-
service benefits under an employer plan even for years in which con-
tributions were made to an IRA. 25 °
The availability of IRAs to the wealthy is even more troublesome
in light of the fact that the poor are not likely to use them to an ap-
preciable extent. 26° Canada has a similar program. In 1969, 12 years
257 I NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 219.
"8 Goetz, Tax Aspects of the New Pension Reform Law, 1975 U. 11.1.. L. FORUM 143,
169-70, See Hearings on Tax Proposals Affecting Private Pension Plans Before the House Comm. on
Ways & Means, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 106 (testimony of Edwin S. Cohen, Ass't Sec'y of
the Treasury for Tax Policy).
25° HOUSE REP., supra note 251, at 127.
260 Hearings, supra note 258, at 401, 402 (statement of Andrew J. Biemiller on behalf
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after adoption of the program, only about 1.2 percent of all returns
filed by persons earning less than $10,000 a year claimed deductions
for contributions to individual retirement programs, while over 35
percent of those persons earning in excess of $25,000 were
participating."' In fact, taxpayers earning over $15,000 (representing
less than 3 percent of all returns) made over 50 percent of the con-
tributions.
Another major difficulty is the denial of IRAs to employees par-
ticipating in employer sponsored plans even if they do not have a
vested interest. 262
 Congress wished to avoid the double coverage
which would arise should the employer contributions become
vested. 263
 On the other hand, with 10 year vesting and a one-year
waiting period for participation, it is not unlikely that an individual
can, even after ERISA, achieve nearly constant participation without
ever earning a benefit.
It would have been better to allow non-vested participants to
make deductible contributions, with the proviso that should they ever
obtain a vested right to a pension based upon the earnings on which
the contribution to the IRA was based, the value of the IRA will be-
come taxable immediately, or over a specified period. A similar rule
could be established with respect to newly established employer plans
which provide past-service benefits, at least for IRAs maintained for
people Who have control over establishment of the plan.
It seemed to me that the primary beneficiaries of IRAs would be
the relatively high paid, or at least those who already planned on sav-
ing and would just transfer their bank account into an IRA. 264 In
part, this would be the result of inertia by those who had very little to
gain. ERISA's provision for employer sponsored IRAs, 265 and the ex-
tensive advertising undertaken by the banking and insurance com-
munities, may indicate somewhat wider use than I envisioned.
Nevertheless, while the returns are not yet in, it would be very sur-
prising if IRAs significantly fill the gap between Social Security and
pre-retirement earnings. The poor without adequate retirement pro-
tection are likely to remain so.
of AFL-CIO). Compare Gold, Tax Deductions for Individuals Retirement Saving, 25 NAT'L TAxf
585 (1972).
2 " See Hearings Before the Subcomm. an Private Pension Plans, Sen. Comm. on Finance, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1166; 1177 (1973) (testimony of Norman H. Tarver—Table No. 5). The
level of participation by high-income persons in Canada may be more than can be expected
in the U.S. since Canada does not preclude deductions for those who are also participating in
employer-sponsored programs. Mr. Tarver believes that my use of the statistics in the text is
misleading because it omits the higher level of employee contributions to employer main-
tained plans which are made by the low income. See id. at 1193-94 (supplementary state-
ment).
2°2 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 219(13)(2).
2°2 HOUSE REP.. supra note 251, at 127.
264 Hearings, supra note 258, at 306, 309 (statement of Daniel Halperin).
!" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 408(c). In effect, this sanctions salary reduction plans,.
see text at notes 108-10 supra, but limits the exclusion of income to the $1,500 IRA
maximum.
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VI. EQUITY IN THE TAX BURDEN
At the present time, we accept an annual revenue loss of nearly
$61/2 billion,262 attributable to the special tax benefits to qualified plans
in order to finance retirement benefits for about 50 percent of the
work force.267
Analysis of who is covered leads to one obvious conclusion. The
uncovered portion is heavily drawn from employees of small com-
panies who tend to be at the lower end of the wage scale. For exam-
ple, one survey222 shows that in companies where employees earn an
average hourly wage of less than $3, the percentage of workers cov-
ered is 18 percent, while if the average earnings are over $7 per
hour the percentage rises to 88 percent. Moreover, the coverage in
companies with over 500 employees is 93 percent as compared to only
38 percent for those companies with under 100 employees. As stated
above, IRAs are not likely to be attractive to people at the income
level where the uncovered predominate. On the other hand, some
people take advantage of the available tax benefits to build up a re-
tirement nest egg of well in excess of $1 million. The Treasury has
indicated that the upper 8 percent of wage earners receive 50 percent
of the tax benefits while the lower 50 percent obtain less than 6 per-
cent of the benefits.262 It seems obvious that the fairness of the tax
law is severely compromised by this situation, and in particular, by the
inadequate limits on the benefits that can be received under qualified
plans.
Section A sets forth the existing rules on maximum benefits
from qualified plans and Section B discusses the case for much more
stringent restrictions. Of course, employers would not be prevented
from providing a larger retirement income on a non-qualified basis.
This raises the question of whether deferral Of tax on such earnings
until after retirement is an unfair tax advantage. Section C deals with
this question.
266 HOUSE COMM.ON TH E BuDeati, H. REP. No.145, 94th Cong„ 1st Sess. 53-55 (1975);
EXECUTIVE OFFICE Orli' PRESI DENT. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND Bu ixIET, BUDGET OF THE
U.S. Gorr Fiscm. YEAR 1976, SPECIAL ANALYSES, Table F- I, at 108-09 (1975).
267 SENATE COMAE ON FINANCE, PRIVATE PENSION PLAN REFORM, S. REP. No. 383, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1973). The frequently cited 50% coverage refers to private non-farm
workers. A recently published survey based upon 1972 finds 63% of these workers are
participating in private plans. Bell, Prevalence of Private Retirement Plans, 98 MONTHLY LABOR
REV. No. 10, at 17, 18 (Oct., 1975). The percentage of retirees actually receiving benefits is
much lower. Of those who initially applied for Social Security benefits in fiscal year
1969-1970, only about 35% (including about one-half of the males) had pension coverage
from their longest job.
268 See Bell, supra note 267.
"° Statement of Frederic W. Hickman, then Ass't Sec'y of the Treasury for Tax
Policy, from Pension and Profit Sharing Plans: The Quintessential Tax Shelter 1 0, before the 25th
NATI. CONE OF THE TAX FOUNDATION (Dec. 5, 1973).
, 791
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
A. Restriction of the Size of Benefits
1. Prior Law
Prior to ERISA, there were no specific limits on the amount of
benefits payable under a qualified plan established by a corporation.
However, contributions to a profit-sharing plan could not be currently
deducted if they exceeded 15 percent of pay. 27° When a profit-
sharing and pension plan were in effect for the same employees, the
combined current deduction limit was 25 percent of compensation."'
In addition, the Internal Revenue Service took the position that a de-
fined benefit plan could not provide a pension in excess of the
employee's highest salary averaged over a reasonable period. 272 Still, if
the President of a corporation earned $250,000 per year, and the
corporation's plan paid a benefit of 70 percent of pay, the President
could have received a pension of $175,000 per year. Such a pension
would require an accumulation of at least $1,750,000. 273
On the other hand, there were severe limitations on contribu-
tions on behalf of self-employed individuals. These contributions
could not exceed the lesser of $2,500 or 10 percent of pay. 274
2. The Effect of ERISA
A limit has been placed on all types of qualified plans. Generally,
a defined benefit plan cannot pay an annual pension of more than
100 percent of average annual earnings during the best three years of
employment, up to a $75,000 maximum. 275 Annual additions (includ-
ing employer contributions, forfeitures and certain employee con-
tributions) to the account of any individual employee under a defined
contribution plan may not exceed 25 percent of his compensation, or
$25,000, whichever is the lesser. 276 The $25,000 and $75,000 amounts
are subject to adjustment as the cost of living rises. 277
If both types of plans have been adopted for the same em-
ployees, one or both of the separate limits will be reduced, so that the
2" INT. REV. CODE or 1954, § 404(a)(3).
" 1 Id. § 404(a)(7).
272 Rev. Rul. 72-3, 1972-1 CUM. BULL. 105.
2"
 For purposes of determining the benefit derived from employee contributions,
ERISA assumes that a $1.00 single life annuity commencing at age 65 requires a $10.00
accumulation at that time. ERISA § 204(c)(2)(B)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(c)(2)(B)(ii) (Supp. IV,
1975); bit REV. CODE OF 1954, § 411(c)(2)(B)00.
2" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 404(e) as it existed prior to ERISA.
225
 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 415(b)(1). The Code permits the $75,000 benefit to
begin at age 55 and he in the form of a 100% joint and survivor annuity for the employee and
his spouse. Id. § 415(b)(2).
278
 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 4I5(c).
2" Id. § 4 I 5(d). The IRS has announced that for 1976, the applicable amounts are
$26,825 and $80,475, respectively, IR 1571, PRENTICE HALL, PENSION AND PROFIT
SHARING 11107147.
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combination plan cannot exceed 140 percent of the separate limit. 278
For example, if the defined contribution plan is fully utilized, the
maximum pension under the defined benefit plan is 40 percent of
pay or $30,000, whichever is less. Still, the combined accumulation for
any one individual under the ERISA limits can easily be close to $2
million. 27 "
The disparity between corporate employees and self-employed
individuals was narrowed by increasing the annual limit on deductible
contributions for the latter to the lesser of $7,500, or 15 percent of
income. 2"
B. The Case for Benefit Restrictions
Noting that the disparity between employee-shareholders and
the self-employed was a "distinction in treatment ... not based on any
difference in reality," which led to artificial pressure for incorporation
of professional practices, the Administration suggested 2 " increasing
the annual limit for deductible contributions on behalf of self-
employed individuals. While, as noted, the distinction is reduced, a
substantial difference "not based on reality" remains. Although the
Administration was not brave enough to face the complaints of those
whose tax benefits would be reduced if similar limits were placed on
corporate plans, it clearly indicated a belief that unlimited pensions
would be an unwarranted tax advantage. What justifies this position?
If an employer can provide a 70 percent pension to someone earning
$10,000 a year, what is the objection to a similar pension to someone
earning $200,000?
1. Measurement of Tax Benefit
As described earlier, the advantage of a qualified plan is the abil-
ity of the employer to deduct a contribution, without there being cur-
rent tax to the employee. Neither the employer nor the employee
pays tax on income, which one or the other has earned, until the em-
27$ INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 415(e).
279 As stated in note 273supra, Congress has assumed a single life annuity at age 65 of
$75,000 would require an accumulation of $750,000.1 f the $75,000 were paid in the form of
a 100% joint and Survivor annuity for the benefit of the employee and his spouse, this could
increase the required accumulation to approximately $960,000. See Rev. Rul. 71-446,
1971-2 Cost. BOLL 187, § 8.02. If the benefit were payable as a joint and survivor annuity at
age 55, the required accumulation could be approximately $2 million. See id. 10.021.
According to advertisements for self-employed plans placed by the Bowery Savings Bank, a
deposit of $10,000 per year, the maximum contribution permitted for an employee utilizing
the defined benefit plan to the limit, would, if made over a 30-year period, produce a total
accumulation in excess of $1-1/4 million at Bowery's current maximum annual rate-8.17%
with daily compounding. Congress estimated an accumulation of about $550,000, assuming
a 6% rate and 25 years. SENATE Rev., supra note 267, at 29.
INT. Rev. Cone or 1954, 404(e).
201
 Hearings, supra note 258, at 6, 8 (statement of Richard M. Nixon).
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ployee receives a distribution." 2
In essence, the deferral of tax amounts to an interest free loan
from the Treasury, to the employer if benefits are not vested, and to
the employee if they are. Complete deferral can also be described as
the equivalent of imposing the tax initially but exempting any earn-
ings on the investment of the after tax amount.'" For example, as-
sume a taxpayer in a 50 percent marginal tax bracket with $10,000 of
pre-tax income available for investment. After tax, this individual will
have $5,000 to invest which at a 10 percent return will produce $500
per year before taxes. If tax is deferred and $10,000 can be invested,
the return at 10 percent is $1,000 before tax and $500 after payment
of tax at the 50 percent rate. The $500 after-tax return is equivalent
to tax free income, because it is the equivalent of the pre-tax return
from the $5,000 investment which would have been made in the ab-
sence of special tax relief. Since the income of the qualified plan is
also exempt from tax, the tax free return on the original contribution
is extended to the income provided by the reinvested earnings.
If the benefit of a qualified plan is visualized as an interest-free
loan, it is clear that for each dollar of retirement benefit purchased,
the higher the tax bracket, the greater the "loan." 2" For example, as-
sume, at a given age, it will take a set-aside of $1,000 per year to fi-
nance a life annuity of $5,000. If the employee is in the 25 percent
bracket, the Treasury's interest free loan is $250 per year; for the
employee in the 50 percent bracket, the loan is twice as much, or
$500 per year. Moreover, the above example assumed an equal con-
tribution. More likely, the contribution fdr the higher bracket indi:
vidual will be greater, since it is not discriminatory to provide a great-
er dollar benefit or make a larger contribution on behalf of the
higher paid, so long as the ratio of contributions or benefits to salary
is uniform. 28s
If one looks at deferral as a means of providing tax free invest-
ment income, qualified plans may appear fair, since all receive equal
tax free treatment. This is a satisfactory result for those who believe
that investment income should not be taxed, or suggest that the only
reason to tax investment income is to impose a burden on wealth. 2 "
A tax on wealth may be said to be inappropriate if the accumulation
will be spent by the individual within his own lifetime during his re-
tirement years. R7
Nevertheless, tax free income is obviously an increasingly greater
2" See text at notes 14-15 supra.
283 Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1113, 1126 (1974).
284 One Treasury estimate shows that the "tax subsidy" more than doubles the
pension for an individual earning $30,000 at age 35 while it increases it by less than 40% for
an individual earning $10,000. See Hickman, supra note 269, at 14.
"2 INT. Rev. CODE OF 1954, § 40I(a)(5).
2" See Andrews, supra note 283, passim.
227 1d. at 1167-69.
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benefit, as the tax bracket increases, and a clear perversion of the
progressive tax ideal. Moreover, even a burden on wealth seems ap-
propriate when the accumulation reaches in excess of one-half million
or one million dollars. With the top tax rate on earned income at 50
percent, 288 it seems impossible to argue that a tax break is needed for
the well-to-do to provide for retirement.
2. Critique of ERISA
The only justification for unlimited tax subsidized retirement
benefits is that it is essential to insure the establishment and mainte-
nance of plans. Unless the higher paid can provide an unlimited pen-
sion for themselves in a tax preferred manner, they will be insuffi-
ciently motivated to provide for the lower paid.m 9 There are two an-
sers to this assertion:
(a) If it is true, it represents an expensive way to provide pen-
sion coverage for the lower paid; the loss of tax equity is too great.
(b) There is no evidence that it is correct.
Tax relief to help build a pension of over $100,000 a year is
especially galling in light of the fact that 50 percent of the working
population, heavily drawn from the lower end of the scale, is not cov-
ered by the private pension system. Why should these people suffer
an increase in tax burden because of the extreme tax savings for those
who receive such large pensions? Moreover, because the higher the
tax bracket, the greater the aid, a high paid individual may still get as
much help, absolutely or even in proportion to pay, despite the fact
that his pension is limited to a lower percentage of earnings.290 In
short, there can be no justification for federal aid to accumulate pen-
sions in the amount permitted by ERISA. 29 '
288 I NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1348.
9 ° 9 See Fint Panel Discussion on Private Plan Reform, Subcomm. on Private Plans, Sen.
Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 77, 91 (1973) (testimony of Carrel Savage in Commit-
tee Print of Testimony to be Received May 31, 1973).
290 For example, compare the following cases, assuming a qualified pension can be
based on only the first $50,000 of earnings and that the hypothetical plan calls for a 50%
benefit.
Assumed 	 Assumed 	 Interest 	 Loan as % of
Earn- 	 Rene- 	 Tax 	 Contri- 	 Free 	 Compensa-
ings 	 fit 	 Bracket 	 bution 	 Loan 	 tion
$20,000 $10,000 25% $2,000 $ 	 500 2-54%
$50,000 $25,000 50% $5,000 $2,500 5%
$100,000 $25,000 50% $5,000 $2,500 2-1/2%
281 Limitations on the size of pensions from qualified plans has had support from a
wide spectrum. See PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE PENSION PROGRAMS, A REPORT TO THE
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If Congress were worried about the effect of benefit limits on
the establishment of plans, it should have viewed ERISA as a first
step. If the limit appears not to have any undue effect on the exist-
ence of plans it could be lowered in actual amount or in substance by
inflation. It is unfortunate that the Act actually contains a built-in
escalator for changes in the cost of living.
There is also an undesirable aspect to the manner in which the
limitation is applied. Aside from the absolute maximum of $75,000,
ERISA limits the retirement benefit to 100 percent of final pay, sub-
ject to a post-retirement cost of living adjustment.292 The overall limit
could alternatively be stated as a $75,000 limitation on the amount of
earnings which can be taken into account under a qualified plan.
However, while ERISA does not permit more than $100,000 of salary
to be taken into account in the case of plans established by sole pro-
prietors, partnerships or subchapter S corporations,293 no limit is
placed on the salary which can be considered under corporate plans.
This has the effect of permitting those who make $200,000, for ex-
ample, to cut the pensions of lower paid to 37-1/2 percent of earnings,
while still providing the maximum pension of $75,000 for themselves.
3. Stricter Limits
I would hope that ERISA is not the last word on maximum ben-
efits from qualified plans and that any further reduction will be uni-
versally applicable. If this is not politically unacceptable, then it is not
unreasonable to examine individual plans to see what proportion of
the persons covered are low paid, or what portion of the total dollar
value of the benefits is allocated to the low paid. If the benefits under
the plan are predominantly for higher paid individuals, there is little
reason to encourage the plan as it then exists. It could be brought
into line by limiting the benefits to the high paid to a specified dollar
amount,294 or more logically, to that amount necessary to produce the
required percentage benefit for the lower paid.
Further, given the present limits on the self-employed, it is sen-
sible to impose limitations on persons who are substantial owners of a
business regardless of the form of business organization.'" At least
this removes the artifical pressure for incorporation.
PRESIDENT ON PRIVATE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT PLANS59 (1965); Legislative Recommendation of
the Comm. on Employee Benefits of the Tax Section of the Am. Bar Ass'n, 24 Ts>: LAWYER 901, 905
(1971).
292 INT. REV, CODE OF 1954, § 415(d)(1)(C).
2" Id. 401(a)(17).
294 The Senate bill which led to ERISA would have imposed limits on the size of
benefits for shareholder employees only if all 2% stockholders together account for 25% of
the total accrued benefits. SENATEREF...supra note 267, at 29. See also Hearings, supra note 258,
at 322 (statement of Rep. Byrnes, then ranking minority member of Ways & Means).
295 The Senate Finance Committee attempted to accomplish this on several occasions.
See Chadwick & Foster, Federal Regulation of Retirement Plan: The Questfor Parity, 28 VAND. L.
796
AN EVALUATION OF ERISA
C. Non-Qualified Deferred Compensation
Of course, any limitation on the amount of pension payable
from a qualified plan would not restrict the compensation payable to
employees on retirement or otherwise. 296 It would be intended only to
curb the special tax relief. In this connection, it must be noted that a
significant part of the deferred compensation of highly paid execu-
tives is determined on an individual basis, 212 and not as part of a qual-
ified plan. Under ERISA this may continue on an unfunded basis. 2"
If compensation is dependent on the performance of substantial fu-
ture services, it seems correct to defer taxation until the amount is
vested. 299 If non-forfeitable compensation is funded by deposit in a
trust fund or purchase of an annuity contract, in a manner so that the
employee is not relying on the credit of the employer, then it is taxa-
ble immediately, even though distribution to the employee is
deferred. 39" If this rule is to remain unchanged, 3" the issue is
whether there should be immediate taxation of an unfunded 302 vested
benefit.
Non-qualified plans do not, at least in the case of taxpaying em-
ployers, catise the same revenue loss as does deferral under a qual-
ified plan. As noted above, the price of such deferral on a non-
qualified basis is a delay in the tax deduction for the employer until
the employee is taxed on the incotne. 303 Nevertheless, many people
believe tax deferral provides an unwarranted advantage which should
be ended or reduced. 304 Some may ask why funding makes a differ-
ence? If one were employed by General Motors, for example, there is
REv. 64 I, 659 n.135 (1974); SENATE REK.supra note 267, at 9, 29, 121. For a similar attempt
limited to professional corporations, see SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, TAX REFORM ACT OF
1969, S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 270-72 (1969). The Senate report on ERISA
expressed the belief that plans of closely-held corporations provided a lower proportion of
the benefit for the rank-and-file employees. SENATE RM.Mg/FR note 267, at 29.
210 Thus, ERISA provides a special exemption for an "excess benefit plan" main-
tained to provide benefits in excess of the § 415 limits. ERISA § 3(36), 29 U.S.C. 1002(36)
(Supp. IV, 1975). See ERISA §§ 4(b)(5), 201(7), 301(a)(9), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1003(h)(5), 1051(7),
1081(a)(9) (Supp. IV, 1975).
217 The individual can elect to defer the payment of compensation, at least as long as
the election is made prior to the beginning of the year in which the amount is earned. Rev.
Rul. 69.650, 1969-2 Cum. Buff. 106; Rev. Proc. 71-19, 1971-1 Cum. Buti.. 698.
21 ' ERISA § 301(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1081(a)(3) (Supp. IV, 1975).
P19 See INT. REV, CODE OF 1954, § 83(a).
31" INT, REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 402(b), 403(c). See Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 Cum. Buff.
174 (Ex. 4).
21 See text following note 247 supra. The American Bar Ass'n Section on Taxation
has suggested that deferral be allowed for funded plans regardless of coverage. See
Hearings, supra note 258, at 229, 239.
1102 There may be funding in the sense that an amount is set aside and invested in
securities or insurance. This does not result in current tax unless the amount set aside is not
part of the employer's general assets and is not reachable by creditors. See Rev. Rul. 68-99,
1968-I Cum. Buff. 193; David Centre, 55 T.C. 16 (1970).
313 See text at notes 239-44, 11-13 supra.
3" See H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 90-91 (1969).
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not much of a distinction between reliance on the employer's credit
and a deposit in a trust fund. If $5,000 of current compensation were
set aside for payment in the future, it is easy to determine the amount
of current tax even though no specific trust is established. 305 Compen-
sation is harder to measure, however, if the employer promises to pay
a specific amount at retirement. While it may not be unduly difficult
to develop tables to measure both current compensation and
hypothetical earnings to the employee under such arrangements, 3" it
may be inadvisable to do so unless deferral is a significant advantage.
Tax deferral will, most obviously, result in tax reduction in the
following circumstances: (I) the employee's tax bracket after retire-
ment is lower than it is while he is employed; (2) the employee is in a
higher tax bracket than the employer. The deferral of income causes
the employer to lose the deduction but the immediate tax is paid at its
bracket rather than the higher rate imposed on the employee. There
is, in effect, an interest-free loan on the difference in tax for the
period of deferral.
With regard to the first circumstance, averaging income so that
the highest marginal rate is determined by spreading income equally
over a lifetime may be a worthwhile goal. It is troublesome, however,
to permit the highly paid to do so when a similar opportunity is not as
available to all taxpayers. Nevertheless, the adoption of the 50 percent
maximum tax on earned income makes it much less likely that the real-
ly high paid executive will have a significantly lower rate after re-
tirement than he has while working. A lower post-retirement rate may
occur most frequently when such persons are investing in the tax shel-
ters that keep them from currently utilizing the maximum tax. 3" But
this lower rate will ordinarily have to be the result of substantially re-
duced income since the maximum tax is unavailable with respect to
many forms of deferred compensation. 308
With regard to the second circumstance the existence of the
maximum tax also makes it much less likely that the employee's rate
of tax will be significantly higher than the employer's. It seems, there-
fore, that the adoption of section 1348, and its inapplicability to most
forms of deferred compensation 309
 has reduced the tax benefit of de-
ferral. The primary advantages would seem to be two factors that are
much less obvious.
If a corporation invests the deferred amounts in dividend paying
stock, it gets an 85 percent dividend received deduction 3 ie the benefit
3" See Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 Cum. Buta. 174 (Ex. 1, 2).
X 08 See Treas. Reg. § 1.403(b)-1(d)(4) (1966).
3" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1348(b)(2)(B).
308 M. § 1348(b)(I).
3" See Halperin, Maximum Tax Nagar Tlwse Indulging in Deferred Compensation and Tax
Preferences, 1972 MAJOR Txx PLANNING 619, 628-38 (24th U.S.C. Tax Institute).
3" INT. Rev. CODE OF 1954, § 243(a)(1).
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of which can be passed on to the employee."' Put another way, while
only 15 percent of the dividends are taxed, the deduction for com-
pensation paid can be the. full amount of the dividend. 312 This clearly
is unwarranted.n 3 If his top tax bracket is over 60 percent and he has
more than $50,000 in capital gains, the employee can also get the ad-
vantage of the lower corporate rate for such income. 314 Moreover, by
shifting the capital gain to the corporation, the employee can
minimize both minimum and maximum tax problems. 3 "
These advantages are significant and no immediate cure is ap-
parent. The ideal would be to segregate the assets which represent the
employee's share and to treat the income thereon as if earned by the
employee. Immediate taxation of compensation does not suffice be-
cause the real advantage is the taxation of investment income. It may
be that funding should be required so that the assets can be isolated.
Perhaps, it would then not be necessary to impose current taxation
even though the employee's interest is vested and funded.
One final point should be noted. It is assumed that there is often
no tax advantage to the employee's deferral of income because it will
be balanced by the employer having to defer the deduction. In a
sense, the interest-free loan to the employee comes from the em-
ployer, rather than the government, and will be taken into account in
the bargaining between the parties. However, this assumed interest-
free loan is a benefit to the employee, which will not be quantified in
proxy material, or the like, and may be hidden from the scrutiny of
shareholders. Thus deferred compensation may be more of a problem
for the SEC and the accountants than it is a question of tax policy.
3" The tax savings from a deduction at the 50% bracket enables the corporation to
distribute $2.00 at a net cost of $1.00. Therefore, irate corporation earns $100 in dividends,
it will distribute $185 to the employee:
Dividend
	
$100.00
Taxable Income 15%
	
$15.00
Tax at 50%
	
7.50
After Tax Income
	
92.50
Distribution at
$2.00 for $1.00
	
185.00
If the employee is in a 50% bracket, the extra distribution will be sufficient to pay his income
tax and he will retain $92.50, the same amount that the corporation had after tax. In these
circumstances, the only effective tax on the dividend income is at the corporate level.
312 In the example in note 311, the corporation earned a $100 dividend which led to
$15 of taxable income and a $92.50 deduction. (The deduction would have been $100 had
the pre-tax amount been distributed).
3" The purpose of the dividend-received deduction is to prevent "triple taxation" of
earnings at the level of the corporate earner, the corporate investor and the individual
shareholder. This possibility does not arise if the corporate investor offsets the taxable
dividend by a deductible payment for salary or interest. The dividend-received deduction
should be limited, if feasible, to dividend income distributed to shareholders.
3" Compare INT. REV. CODE Or 1954, § 120I(a), with id. §§ I201(b)(2)(A), 1201(d)(3),
1202.
313 See INT. REV. CODE or 1954, §§ 57(a)(9)(A), 56(a)( I), 1348(b)(2)(B).
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VII. CONCLUSION AND PROGRAM FOR THE FUTURE
Congress certainly did not alleviate all of the problems of the
private pension system. In fact, it probably could not have passed so
massive a bill without making some things worse, at least during the
shake down period as people adjust to the new rules. Nevertheless,
ERISA is a giant step forward, if the private pension route is to be
followed.
A. Improvements to Private Pensions
ERISA has strengthened the private system by making the prom-
ise of a pension more secure. The picture as to tax equity is harder to
judge. The question depends on the utilization of IRAs and the larger
deduction for the self-employed. If this is top-heavy enough, it will
outweigh the mild improvement from the new benefit limits and the
conditions on coverage and vesting. This article has suggested that the
private system could be further improved in the following manner.
Title I should require more rapid vesting if studies indicate loss
of significant accrued benefits for periods in which retirement savings
normally takes place, at least if the cost of the benefit is reflected in
the wage rate. The Internal Revenue Code should at a minimum re-
quire vesting of significant accrued benefits earned during periods in
which sound public policy suggests that savings for retirement should
ideally occur.316 Further, the vesting standard of the Internal Revenue
Code should preclude discrimination in favor of the highly paid.3"
Service for vesting purposes should not be required to be continuous
unless absolutely essential for administrative reasons.3" In any event,
service after a break-in-service should have the same effect in defined
contributions plans as it does in defined benefit plans.
I have also suggested that employee contributions be prohibited
as a condition for participation3" and that plans for salaried workers
only be considered discriminatory unless the hourly workers are in a
separate collective bargaining unit.32° The procedure for integration
with social security should be modified to allow integration only when
the plan benefit after integration will, in combination with social se-
curity, assure full replacement of income immediately prior to
retirement.32'
Target benefit plans and insured individual contract plans
should be made subject to plan termination insurance with respect to
their actual past-service benefit. If this is not acceptable and it appears
3" See text at notes 44-46 supra.
3" See text at notes 60-63 supra.
3" See text at notes 75-76 supra.
3" See text at notes 122-23 supra.
32" See text at note 131 supra.
321 See text at notes 129-30 supra.
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likely that a significant number of defined benefit plans are in danger
of being replaced by target benefit plans, then consideration might be
given to phasing in the guarantee of new benefits over a longer than
5 year period. 3 "
The tax treatment of non-qualified plans for rank-and-file em-
ployees could conceivably be changed 'to defer both the employer de-
duction and taxation of employees if studies indicate that a significant
revenue loss is unlikely and that.the tax rules have harmed the effort
to promote retirement security. 323 It may also be advisable to require
funding for non-qualified plans for the higher paid and accord simi-
lar deferral, particularly if I am right in my belief that the major tax
benefit to deferral is the treatment of investment income under pres-
ent law. 324
Tax equity requires that the limits on benefits from qualified
plans be further reduced. 3" Moreover, if IRAs are to be continued,
they should be denied to all those whp earn over a specified amount
and in particular to the self-employed and substantial shareholders of
corporations. 326 Employees with non-vested pensions should be al-
lowed to contribute to IRAs. Perhaps' a tax credit should be consid-
ered if IRAs are not being utilized by low income workers to the de-
sired extent. Inequities in the tax law would further be mitigated by
the elimination of the special treatment of distributions in a lump
sum 327 or in the form of employer securities378 and by the repeal of
the estate tax exclusion. 3" In Tact, investments in employer securities by
qualified plans should be prohibited. 33 °
Finally, the annual statement to employees of accrued and vested
benefits should be made mandatory and should indicate the portion
guaranteed if the plan were to terminate. 3 "
B. Social Security as an Alternative
I have offered little hope that even with these improvements, the
average family can expect to carry over approximately the same stan-
dard of living into their retirement years. Studies have indicated that
this goal requires retirement income of from 70-80 percent of the last
year's earnings.332 Less than 100 percent replacement is needed be-
cause of elimination of work-related expenses, lower taxes on retire-
022 See text at note 210 supra.
323 See text at note 247 supra.
324 See text following note 315 supra.
325 See text at notes 290-95 supra.
320 See text at notes 258-63 supra.
322 See text at notes 160-63 supra.
325 See text at note 212 supra.
323 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2039(c).
"° See Section 111, Part D supra.
"' See text at note 256 supra.
332 See Henle, Recent Trends in Retirement Benefits Related to Ea
REV. No. 6, at 12, 18 (June, 1972).
gs, MONTHLY LABOR
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ment income and the availability of Medicare.
For persons retiring in 1976, Social Security provides a benefit
of at least 60 percent of the wages on which it is based. 333 If both
spouses have reached retirement age, the addition of the spouse's
benefit brings the total benefit up to at least 90 percent of covered
wages. 334 If this benefit were based on the final year's earnings, it
would be adequate to maintain the pre-retirement standard of living.
Unfortunately, however, covered wages are determined by an average
of at least nineteen years dating back to the time when the taxable
wage base was only $4,200. Thus, even though the maximum tax base
for 1975 was $14,100, the highest average earnings for benefit pur-
poses is approximately $7,000. 335 The combined husband and wife
benefit would therefore be less than 50 percent if actual pre-
retirement earnings were $14,000.
Until now at least, 336 Social Security has not been geared to be
sufficient to maintain the worker's pre-retirement standard of living,
333 As described in note 335 infra, the maximum covered wages for a man retiring in
1976 is $7,026 or $585 per month. As of July 1976, this amount will increase to $387.30 or
approximately 60%. (The benefit payable on $585 is $364 or approximately 62%.) The
ratio of benefit to wages is greater at lower earnings levels. See 40 Fed. Reg. 22291-96 (May
22, 1975).
"4 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(6)(2), 402(c)(3).
333 See 42 U.S.C. § 415(b), Men retiring in 1976 must take account of wages on which
Social Security taxes were paid for all years after 1950 and before the year they reached age
64. (After a brief transition period, this age will be 62 for men as it now is for women.) They
may drop out the five lowest years and substitute any period of work after age 64 for the 6th
etc. lowest year during the computation period. If the individual retiring in 1976 was 65 at
the time, the last year in the computation period would be 1974. The computation period,
thus, stretches over 24 years, of which the high 19 are used to compute the wages on which
Social Security will be paid. If the worker always earned at least the maximum amount on
which Social Security taxes were paid the calculation would be as follows:
Years Wage Base Total Wages
$7,026
1957-58(2)
1959-65(7)
1966-67(2)
1968-71(4)
1972 	 (1)
1973 	 ( )
1974 	 ( I)
1975 	 ( I)
19
$ 	 4,200
4,800
6,600
7,800
9,000
10,800
13,200
14,100
$ 	 8,400
33,600
13,200
31,200
9,000
10,800
13,200
14,100
T $133,500
See generally Ball, Social Security Amendments of 1972: Summary & Legislative History, 36 Soc.
SEC. BULL. No. 3, at 3 (March, 1973); Notes & Brief Reports, 38 SOC. SEC. BULL. No. 7, at 33, 34
(July, 1975); Ball, Social Security & Private Pension Plans, 27 NArLTAx J. 467, 468-69 (1974).
"6 Assuming the Social Security Act remains unchanged, the built-in escalators in the
system which increase both covered wages and the ratio of benefits to wages might, about
1995, begin to produce an increase in replacement level which, according to some estimates,
would reach about 90% in the middle of the 21st Century. There appears to be some doubt
that this will be allowed to happen. See Ball, supra note 335, at 468; Brittain, Social Security
Taxes: Problems and Prospects forReform Revisited, 4 TAX NOTES No. 6, at 18, 20 (Feb. 9, 1976).
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even for a worker whose wages were always below the level subject to
contributions under the Social Security Act. As noted, the private
pension system is supposed to provide the difference but as this Arti-
cle has described, it is very difficult to arrange this when the system is
voluntary. Tax incentives can encourage behavior that would not be
undertaken in an unregulated market. However, the more stringent
the requirements placed upon private plans, the less likely they are to
meet the employer's objective. It will therefore cost more in tax ex-
penditures to purchase such programs. At some point, the cost be-
comes too great, and the attempt to coerce a private plan must be
given up.
The Labor movement in particular urges improvements in Social
Security as the only certain means of providing adequate retirement
income. 337
 Such proposals have run into opposition. 338 Social Security
is financed by a highly visible payroll tax which will be difficult to in-
crease significantly. 339
 The cost of private pensions in the form of
lower wages is more hidden. Forcing people to save for retirement is
objectionable to some but may be tolerable when what is sought is a
subsistence level of income. However, many believe the individual
should be .allowed to choose whether he wants to maintain his living
standard after retirement or live it up while young and struggle along
later. A worker may not have much to say about the level of the
employer's pension plan, but he can exercise some choice in job selec-
tion. Finally, Social Security has been administered as an inter-
generational transfer systern. 34° Today's workers support those pres-
ently retired with the expectation that the next generation of workers
will do the same for them. Under a private plan there is at least a
partial build-up of assets which means the worker provides for himself'
to some extent. This may be preferred as a matter of equity or merely
because it reduces spending and increases saving. 341
C. Compulsory Private Pensions
If it is not politically feasible to bring Social Security up to the
required level, or more flexibility is desired than can be expected with
a public program, the only alternative is to require employers to sup-
plement the basic Social Security benefits, to the extent necessary to
' 3 ' See Seidman, Future Structure of Social Security System and Interrelation with Private
Pension Plans, 27 NArt.TAx J. 473, 477 (1974).
338
 See Ball, supra note 335, al 470-71. See also Remarks of John S. Nolan, Deputy Ass't
Sec'y of the Treasury for Tax Policy, New Developments Affecting Employee Benefits 7, before
the Federal Tax Institute of New England (Dec. 5, 1970); Bok, Emerging Issues in Social
Legislation: Social Security, 80 HARV. L. REV. 717 (1967).
339 See J . BRITFAIN, THE PAYROLL TAX FOR SOCIAL sEctiRrry (1 972); Ball, supra note
335, at 470.
3" J. PECE i MAN, H. AARON, M. TAUSSIG, SOCIAL. SECURITY PERSPECTIVF-S FOR REFORM,
71, 173 (1968).
341 Ball, supra note 335, at 471.
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bring an employee's retirement income up to the desired level, say 60
to 80 percent of final earnings. This commitment could perhaps be
met through a private retirement plan or, at the option of the em-
ployer, through contributions to a collective plan administered by the
Social Security system.342 In either case, this minimum coverage
should be required to be given on the basis of full and immediate
vesting. In tandem, therefore, the public and private retirement pro-
grams would be required to provide employees with retirement in-
come at a level which will assure that they do not suffer an appreci-
able reduction in their standard of living on retirement.
Although a number of people343 have suggested a compulsory
private system, it is not yet a concept which has received much public
discussion. Further, it will require additional study to work out the
technical details. However, there are only two feasible alternatives if
the goal of adequate retirement income is to be achieved. If Social
Security will not be improved to achieve this objective on its own, a
compulsory private system must be considered.
312 Finland apparently has such a compulsory system. See Note, The Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974, 26 SYR. L. REV. 539, 556 (1975).
343 See, e.g., Hearings on Tax Proposals Affecting Private Pension Plans Before the Howe
Comm. on Ways & Means, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 828,829 (statement of Robert D. Paul);
Grubbs, An Adequate Retirement Income for Every American, Address to the Social of Actuaries
(Feb. 1972).
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